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THE CRASH OF 1987: A LEGAL AND PUBLIC
POLICY ANALYSIS
LEWIS D. SOLOMON*
HOWARD B. DICKER**
INTRODUCTIONO n "Black" Monday, October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average ("DJIA") plummeted 508 points to 1738.74 on record
trading volume of 604.3 million shares.1 This 22.6 percent drop far ex-
ceeded the 12.8 percent decline on October 28, 1929, which touched off
the Great Depression.' In the aftermath of the crash of 1987, several
studies and hearings were conducted to investigate its cause and to make
recommendations to avert a similar event,3 in order to restore confidence
in the capital markets. These efforts have produced conflicting conclu-
sions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the existence of derivative instru-
ments (specifically, stock index futures and options) and the use of
program trading strategies contributed to the market "break."
At least six studies have investigated the crash of 1987. Nicholas Kat-
zenbach, in a study commissioned by the New York Stock Exchange,
concluded that stock index futures-related trading encouraged too much
speculation and recommended restraints on such trading by consolidat-
ing regulatory authority and raising futures margins.4 In contrast, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, in its preliminary report, found that fu-
tures trading did not cause the stock market decline and that low mar-
gins did not exacerbate the crash.' Similarly, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission did not find stock index futures responsible for the
problem.' The Commission called for improved coordination between
* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center; B.A.
1963, Cornell University; J.D. 1966, Yale University.
** B.S. 1983, University of Pennsylvania; M.S. 1984, State University of New York
at Albany; Candidate for J.D. 1989, George Washington University National Law
Center.
1. See Metz, Murray, Ricks & Garcia, Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling,
Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
2. See id.
3. See Vise, Studies Aim to Clear Muddy Waters of Stock Market Plunge, Wash.
Post, Nov. 29, 1987, at Hl, col. 2.
4. See N. Katzenbach, An Overview of Program Trading and Its Impact on Current
Market Practices 29-32 (Dec. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Katzenbach Study] (study commis-
sioned by the New York Stock Exchange).
5. See M. Miller, J. Hawke Jr., B. Malkiel & M. Scholes, Preliminary Report of the
Committee of Inquiry Appointed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to Examine the
Events Surrounding October 19, 1987 55-56 (Dec. 22, 1987) [hereinafter CME Report].
6. See Division of Economic Analysis & Division of Trading & Markets, Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission, Final Report on Stock Index Futures and Cash Market
Activity During October 1987 to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission iv-
xiii (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter CFTC Final Report]; see also Division of Trading & Markets,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Follow-up Report on Financial Oversight of
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exchanges and regulators and for better market data collection.7
In another study, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") found that
the breakdown of computer systems at the New York Stock Exchange
accentuated the selling pressure on October 19. 8 The GAO suggested
improving these systems to cope with extraordinary trading volume. 9
Additionally, the office recommended that regulatory authorities estab-
lish contingency plans for future emergencies.1"
The Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms (the Brady Com-
mission) attributed the market crash to the employment of computer
trading strategies by a few of the largest institutional investors. 1' The
Task Force called for a single agency, such as the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, to coordinate the regulation of stocks, stock
index futures, and stock index options trading because these three mar-
kets are essentially a single market. 2 Furthermore, the Task Force rec-
ommended the use of "circuit breakers," coordinated trading halts or
limits, to slow trading when it becomes frenzied. 3
A report published by the Securities and Exchange Commission con-
cluded that stock index futures-related trading had contributed to the
crash of 1987 and that computerized trading increased intra-day stock
price volatility.14 The SEC suggested additional market surveillance,
better coordination among exchanges, and a review of margin levels for
futures to control unusual stock price volatility.' 5
Finally, the report of the Working Group on Financial Markets pro-
posed brief halts in trading across the stock, stock options, and stock
index options and futures markets in the case of an extraordinarily large
market decline. 6 The report did not, however, recommend changing the
level of minimum margins on futures contracts.17
Stock Index Futures Markets During October 1987 (Jan. 6, 1988) [hereinafter CFTC
Follow-up Report]; Division of Economic Analysis & Division of Trading & Markets,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Interim Report on Stock Index Futures and
Cash Market Activity During October 1987 to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (Nov. 9, 1987) [hereinafter CFTC Interim Report].
7. See CFTC Final Report, supra note 6, at xii-xiii.
8. See General Accounting Office, Preliminary Observations on the October 1987
Crash 5-8 (Jan. 26, 1988) [hereinafter GAO Report].
9. See id. at 8.
10. See id.
11. See Report of The Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms v (Jan. 1988)
[hereinafter Task Force Report].
12. See id. at 69.
13. See id.
14. See Division of Market Regulation, Securities & Exchange Commission, The Oc-
tober 1987 Market Break xiii-xiv (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter SEC Report].
15. See id. at xiv-xvii.
16. See Interim Report of The Working Group on Financial Markets 4 (May 1988)
[hereinafter Working Group Report] (The Working Group was authorized by the Presi-
dent to report on actions which might lessen systematic damages to the financial
markets).
17. See id. at 5.
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In addition to these studies, Congress has held numerous hearings
since the market break in an effort to develop a legislative response.
Some testimony has called for eliminating stock index futures and op-
tions and/or banning the related computerized trading strategies.
18
Three bills have been introduced to date. One authorizes the Federal
Reserve Board to regulate margin requirements of derivative financial
instruments (such as stock index futures and options).19 Another would
create an Intermarket Coordination Committee whose purpose would be
to develop a more coordinated regulatory system.20 The third bill pro-
poses to give exclusive jurisdiction over derivative instruments to the
SEC and to give margin setting authority to the Fed.21
This Article concludes that many of the current regulatory efforts are
"quick fixes," aimed at treating symptoms rather than aimed at address-
ing the long-run, structural problems of the financial markets. In order
to restore investors' confidence, policymakers must consider the current
(and future) structure of the financial markets. This structure is pres-
ently shaped by the short-term focus of institutional investors, continuing
innovations in technology, and the globalization of money flows. 22 The
effects of these three dynamic forces may destabilize the financial mar-
kets of the United States, creating uncertainty, volatility in stock prices,
and loss of investor confidence. Moreover, additional instability may re-
inforce these same attributes. In this changing environment, it will be
very difficult for United States regulators alone to formulate a policy re-
sponse. Thus, if the nation's policymakers do anything, they should take
steps to ensure that the financial system will be able to withstand the
effects of inevitable price shocks, instead of focusing only on increasing
the regulation of the markets.
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of derivative instruments
and the development of futures markets as a response to a need for the
mutually desired transfer of price risk. Part II explores one of these in-
struments, stock index futures contracts, in detail. Moreover, this Part
explains how institutional investors employ computer assisted strategies,
such as program trading, that utilize stock index futures. Part III exam-
ines the current regulatory structure governing derivative instruments
and how it reflects jurisdictional disputes among several government
agencies. Drawing from the six major studies, Part IV briefly describes
the stock market crash of 1987 with an emphasis on the role played by
the stock index futures and related trading strategies. Finally, Part V
18. See Ricks, Regan Calls Financial Markets 'Rigged,' Assails Program Trading, In-
dex Futures, Wall St. J., May 12, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
19. See S. 1847, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
20. See S. 2256, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Ree. 3641 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1988).
The Intermarket Coordination Committee consists of the chairpersons of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
21. See H.R. 4997, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-8 (1988).
22. See infra Part V.
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addresses public policy responses to the crash of 1987. Specifically, this
Part describes several regulatory proposals aimed at preventing a similar
occurrence, and concludes that many of these remedies are not the
proper treatment for deeper structural problems in the financial market.
I. DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS: THE EVOLUTION
OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS
The futures and options markets evolved in response to the risks asso-
ciated with unanticipated price variability. Consider the predicament of
Illinois wheat farmers in the mid-nineteenth century.23 With the opening
of the Illinois-Michigan Canal and the laying of railroad track, farmers
could ship their harvest to Chicago. Merchants would purchase the
grain in Chicago and store it temporarily, awaiting the arrival of ships to
transport the harvest to eastern markets and abroad. Sometimes, the
amount of grain received exceeded the capacity of storage and shipping
facilities, forcing farmers to sell their crops at reduced prices. On the
other hand, when deliveries were too small, prices would surge. Farmers
eventually found that they could avoid the price risk by participating in
futures and options markets.
Before the introduction of exchange-traded futures and options, farm-
ers, distributors, and processors began contracting for the delivery of ag-
ricultural commodities at a prearranged price, well in advance of the
actual delivery date.24 These delayed delivery transactions, known as
either "to arrive" or "forward" contracts, enabled farmers to secure a
specific price while allowing distributors and processors to obtain a guar-
anteed supply of the commodity.25 Forward contracts also transferred
the risk of an unfavorable price movement from the farmer to the next
entity in the distribution chain. These merchants and buyers, however,
did not want to carry this risk either.26 As a result, forward contracts
included substantial risk premiums resulting in lower prices paid to farm-
ers or a higher price charged to consumers.27 Eventually, speculators
willing to assume these risks with their own capital began to buy and sell
forward contracts without waiting for delivery in the hope of profiting
from any change in value.28 Thus, the merchant who was unwilling to
absorb the price risk could sell the forward contract to a speculator who
was willing to gamble on the change in prices but not willing to take the
actual delivery.29
23. See Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Action in the Marketplace 2-3 (1987);
A. Loosigian, Stock Index Futures 24-26 (1985).
24. See F. Horn, Trading in Commodity Futures 5-6 (2d ed. 1984).
25. See Wolkowitz, Stock Index Futures in Historical Perspective, in Stock Index Fu-
tures 9, 11 (F. Fabozzi & G. Kipnis eds. 1984).
26. See A. Loosigian, supra note 23, at 27-28.
27. See id. at 28.
28. See F. Horn, supra note 24, at 6.
29. See id.
[Vol. 57
THE CRASH OF 1987
Inadequacies inherent in forward contracts, which made them unat-
tractive to speculators, contributed to the development of futures and
options contracts.30 One problem with forward contracts was the lack of
standardized contract terms.31 Each forward contract was a custom con-
tract between two parties.32 Accordingly, each contract had its own
method of determining payment and price.33 Moreover, there was no
standardized quantity or quality of the deliverable commodity. 3  The
lack of standard contracts, therefore, contributed greatly to the virtual
absence of reliable and comparative price information.35
Another problem associated with forward contracts, owing to their
customized nature, concerned the lack of a satisfactory means of enforce-
ment.36 If one party to the contract did not perform, the other party's
only recourse would be litigation.37 Forward contracts became costly to
negotiate because the non-commercial trader was generally unfamiliar
with evaluating the credit risk of the other party to the contract.38 These
two inadequacies made the resale of forward contracts (and thus the effi-
cient allocation of risk) difficult and expensive. These shortcomings
eventually led to the standardization of contracts and the organization of
futures and options exchanges on which futures and options contracts
are traded.
Futures contracts and options contracts are derivative instruments, in
that their values depend primarily on the prices of the underlying com-
modities, currencies, financial instruments or indices on which they are
based.3 9 Indeed, the futures and options markets are distinguishable
from the cash markets (frequently referred to as the spot markets), where
the underlying commodities' are themselves bought and sold.41 A fu-
30. See Wolkowitz, supra note 25, at 11.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See F. Horn, supra note 24, at 6.
35. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, A Study of the Effects on
the Economy of Trading in Futures and Options, ch. 3, at 3 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter
Interagency Study].
36. See id.
37. See Wolkowitz, supra note 25, at 11.
38. See Interagency Study, supra note 35, ch. 3, at 3.
39. See Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 6; Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 5.
It is interesting to note that stocks are derivative themselves. Stock ownership represents
a claim on the underlying firm. However, "[p]rice information about the value of a com-
pany is usually derived from bids and offers in the market for the firm's securities rather
than from bids and offers for the company itself. The underlying market is far too illiquid
to use on a continuous basis to value the firm." Silber, The Economic Role of Financial
Futures, in Futures Markets: Their Economic Role 83, 114 n.27 (A. Peck ed. 1985).
40. There is no cash market for an index since it is merely a mathematical calculation;
however, there is a cash market for the securities composing the index (i.e., the stock
market is a "cash" market).
41. See F. Horn, supra note 24, at 7.
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tures contract is a binding agreement to buy or sell a particular item 42 on
a future date for a predetermined price.43 A "long" position holder, who
has bought a contract, profits from rising futures prices. A "short" posi-
tion holder, who has sold the futures, profits from a price decline. Both
parties to futures contracts are obligated to comply with the contract. 44
All futures trading and listed options trading is conducted on organ-
ized exchanges using standardized contracts for each type of underlying
item, in accordance with the rules adopted by each exchange. 45 Because
the terms and conditions of futures contracts are uniform, the seller and
buyer need negotiate only the month of delivery, the number of contracts
and the price. Members of exchanges trade futures and options in areas
of the exchange floor designated for a particular future or option.46 Each
member makes competitive bids or offers by open outcry until a transac-
42. There are futures contracts on agricultural and industrial commodities (e.g.,
wheat and copper) as well as on currencies (e.g., West German Marks), financial instru-
ments (e.g., Treasury bonds), and indices (e.g., Standard & Poors 500 Index). See R.
Teweles & F. Jones, The Futures Game 58-75 (2d ed. 1987). There are no futures con-
tracts on individual stocks. See Johnson, Federal Regulation in Securities and Futures
Markets, in Futures Markets: Their Economic Role 305 & n.29 (A. Peck ed. 1985).
43. See R. Teweles & F. Jones, supra note 42, at 22.
44. See Interagency Report, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 1.
45. An option is a contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
buy or sell a particular item on or before a future date for a specified price (called the
exercise or striking price). See L. McMillan, Options as a Strategic Investment 4 (2d ed.
1986). The option buyer (or holder) makes a non-refundable payment (the premium) to
the seller (or writer) for the rights conveyed by the option. See The Options Clearing
Corporation, Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options 6 (1987). As compared
to the two dimensions of futures contracts (that is, buyers are long and sellers are short),
options contracts have four dimensions. A purchaser can either buy calls or buy puts.
See Options Clearing Corporation, supra, at 4. A call option conveys the right to buy,
and a put option the right to sell, a specific quantity of the underlying interest. See id.
Similarly, an options seller can sell either puts or calls. See id. While the option buyer
incurs the risk of losing his investment-the premium-the option seller assumes poten-
tially unlimited risk if the price of the underlying interest moves unfavorably. See Op-
tions Clearing Corporation, supra, at 16-21. Sellers of options have the unconditional
obligation to perform whenever the buyer chooses to exercise the option. See Interagency
Study, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 1.
There are options on currencies, financial instruments, indices, and futures (all of
which are generally referred to as non-equity options). Additionally, there are options on
individual stocks (for example, equity options). There are no options, however, on agri-
cultural or industrial commodities. See L. McMillan, supra, at 586-97.
A thorough discussion of options contracts is beyond the scope of this Article, which
will primarily be limited to futures contracts. For a comprehensive analysis of options
contracts, see generally id. at 1-27; Stoll & Whaley, The New Option Markets, in Futures
Markets: Their Economic Role 205 (A. Peck ed. 1985). Nevertheless, the general princi-
ples involved with futures are also applicable to options.
46. See F. Horn, supra note 24, at 98. Although the design of the floor at each ex-
change is different, trading is usually conducted in octagonal pits or around rings, which
are flat in the center and have wide concentric steps ascending in stages to the edge. The
steps help the traders see one another. They stand in specific areas in the pits according
to the delivery month in which they are trading. See id. See generally Board of Trade of
the City of Chicago, supra note 23, at 7-11 (describing the trading floor of the Chicago
Board of Trade in greater detail).
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tion is completed;47 no trades may be made by private negotiations.48
Each exchange requires that its members submit records of negotiated
trades to the exchange's clearing house.49 The clearing house provides
several essential functions. It compares the reports of transactions sub-
mitted by buyers and sellers and accepts all properly matched trades for
clearance. More importantly, it interposes itself between the original
parties and substitutes itself as the other party to each side of the
transaction.50
One consequence of inter-positioning by the clearing house is that once
a transaction clears, a buyer need not concern himself with the identity
or the creditworthiness of the seller, or vice versa. 51 Every transaction is
guaranteed by the clearing house, which ensures the financial integrity of
futures transactions primarily through the margin system.5 2  Conse-
quently, futures markets facilitate trading among parties who have not
dealt with each other in the past. 3
In addition, because the clearing house becomes the buyer to every
seller and the seller to every buyer, it allows a party with an open posi-
tion to liquidate it at any time by making a subsequent offsetting trade
with any member on the exchange. 4 Although futures positions can be
held until settled on the future delivery date by actual delivery or cash
settlement (depending on the futures contract), virtually all futures con-
tracts are closed out by offset prior to delivery.5 Differences in the
prices of offsetting contracts represent gains or losses that are settled in
cash. 6 Thus, the principle of settlement by offset allows speculators to
participate in futures trading without taking delivery, and permits com-
mercial concerns to use futures as a temporary financial hedge, without
affecting inventories. 7
An open position in the futures market represents a legal obligation,
47. See 1 T. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets
§ 1.06 (1988). In the pits, "members shout and wave their arms to attract attention to
their bids and offers." Because a buyer and seller might be thirty feet away from each
other, "they use [standard] hand signals to communicate the details of the bids and offers
and to acknowledge their acceptance." Smidt, Trading Floor Practices on Futures and
Securities Exchanges: Economics, Regulation, and Policy Issues, in Futures Markets:
Regulatory Issues 55 (A. Peck ed. 1985).
48. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 47, § 1.09.
49. See id. § 2.01.
50. See id. § 2.02.
51. See Peck, The Economic Role of Traditional Commodity Futures Markets, in Fu-
tures Markets: Their Economic Role 6-7 (A. Peck ed. 1985).
52. See Tomek, Margins on Futures Contracts: Their Economic Roles and Regulation,
in Futures Markets: Regulatory Issues 148-49 (A. Peck ed. 1985).
53. See Kling, Futures Markets and Transaction Costs, in Financial Futures and Op-
tions in the U.S. Economy 51 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System 1986).
54. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 47, § 2.01.
55. See CFTC Follow-up Report, supra note 6, at 15 & n.22 (less than one percent of
all futures contracts traded in each year from 1980 to 1986 actually resulted in delivery).
56. See R. Fink & R. Feduniak, Futures Trading: Concepts and Strategies 49 (1988).
57. See id. at 48-49.
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and a margin acts as a security deposit (or performance bond) to ensure
performance of the contract.5" The exchanges and the clearing houses
(not the Federal government) establish the amount of margin required to
be deposited for each type of contract.59 Initially, both the buyer and the
seller of a futures contract must post margin deposits in cash, govern-
ment securities, or letters of credit.' This deposit amounts to approxi-
mately 10 percent of the full contract value. Additionally, profits and
losses on open futures contracts are settled daily in cash through a pay-
ment and collection process.6 Accordingly, the futures markets are
"zero sum" in nature: within the futures market, for every profit there is
an offsetting loss.62 Thus, although allowing for leveraged transactions,63
trading on margin in the futures industry does not involve an extension
of credit.'
58. See Tomek, supra note 52, at 144.
59. See CFTC Follow-up Report, supra note 6, at 27. There are four types of futures
margins. Clearing houses collect "original" and "variation" margins from their clearing
members. In a similar manner, the exchanges require futures commission merchants
(e.g., brokerage houses) to receive "initial" and "maintenance" margins from their cus-
tomers. See id. at 16.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 18-19. In part, this process is accomplished by re-valuing (or "marking-
to-market") open futures positions. At the end of each trading day, all futures contracts
are marked to their current settlement price (i.e., market value). If the value of a long
position increases, or if the value of a short position decreases, an unrealized profit is
created. If the balance in the customer's brokerage account plus this unrealized profit
exceeds the initial margin requirement, the customer may withdraw this excess margin in
cash. On the other hand, if the value of a long position decreases, or if the value of a
short position increases, and this unrealized loss causes the value of the account to fall
below the maintenance margin level, the customer must supply additional margin to the
brokerage house sufficient to restore the intial margin amount.
To illustrate this process, assume that Trader L initiated a long position in the Stan-
dard & Poor's ("S&P") 500 index futures contract on Tuesday at the closing index value
of 300.00, representing $150,000 (300.00 X $500). On the other side of this transaction
was Trader S, the "short." Furthermore, assume that each trader deposited a required
$15,000 initial margin with his respective broker and that the minimum maintenance
margin is $10,000. On Wednesday, the value of the S&P 500 index futures contract falls
and closes at 275.00. By marking the positions to market, Trader L incurs a loss of
$12,500, but Trader S profits ($150,000 - (275.00 X $500)).
Trader L (Long) Trader S (Short)
Margin Deposit $15,000 $15,000
Unrealized P/L (12,500) + 12,500
Closing Balance $2,500 $27,500
Since the mark-to-market process has reduced Trader L's balance below the minimum
maintenance margin level, he must deposit an additional $12,500 with his broker to re-
store the initial margin level. On the other hand, Trader S can withdraw the excess
margin of $12,500.
62. See id. at 19.
63. See id. at 27.
64. In contrast, margin transactions in securities trading involve an extension of
credit from the broker-dealer to the purchaser of the securities. See Tomek, supra note
52, at 145. A purchaser of stock is required to deposit a minimum amount, the margin,
with his broker so that title to those shares passes to the purchaser. See CFTC Follow-up
Report, supra note 6, at 14. Generally, the minimum deposit prescribed by Regulation T
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The participants in the futures markets fall into three general catego-
ries: hedgers, speculators and market makers." Hedgers are risk
averters 66 They use futures to reduce their risk exposure to price fluctu-
ations in connection with their primary activities in the underlying com-
modities or financial assets.' Arbitrage is a form of hedging. 8
Arbitrageurs simultaneously buy and sell similar items in different mar-
kets, attempting to profit from pricing discrepancies between the two
markets.6 9 By contrast, speculators expect to benefit by increasing their
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which applies to customers of
securities brokers, is 50% of the market value of the stock. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.18
(1988). Regulation T, issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
governs the extension of credit by brokers and dealers. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.18 (1988).
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, A Review and Evaluation of
Federal Margin Regulations 47-51 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter Review of Margins]. The
broker lends the purchaser the remaining balance, the difference between the purchase
price and the margin deposit, and the value of the stock, which is held in the broker's
name, serves as collateral for the loan. See CFTC Follow-up Report, supra note 6, at 14-
15. Accordingly, the purchaser pays interest on the balance outstanding. Thus, while
futures margins are performance bonds, securities margins represent down payments that
are equity. See id.
65. See R. Fink & R. Feduniak, supra note 56, at 64-72.
66. See id. at 64.
67. See id. As illustrated by the predicament confronting the Illinois wheat farmers,
the futures and options markets first developed in the agricultural sector to insulate farm-
ers and merchants from unanticipated price changes in their commodities. The farmer
can protect himself from the risk of an adverse price fluctuation by hedging his antici-
pated actual market position with an opposite position in the futures market. See V.
Harper, Handbook of Investment Products and Services 250 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, a loss
on one position will be offset by a gain on the other. For example, in May, suppose the
wheat farmer expects to harvest and sell 20,000 bushels in September. The spot price is
currently $3.00 a bushel. If a September wheat futures contract is valued at $3.15 a
bushel (and assuming this price would provide the farmer with a reasonable profit), the
farmer could sell four futures contracts of 5,000 bushels each. Hence, he creates an antic-
ipatory hedge-effectively locking-in a $3.15 per bushel price. See id.; Peck, supra note
51, at 19-21. Assume by September, the spot price for wheat has plunged to $2.90.
Although the farmer would incur a loss on the sale of his crop at this price, overall, he
will not. Because spot and futures prices converge in the delivery month (and because the
activity of arbitrageurs tends to "align" futures and spot prices), when the farmer offsets
his original sale of futures with a purchase of four contracts, he will make a profit of
$0.25 a bushel ($3.15 - $2.90). Consequently, the proceeds from the actual sale of wheat
($2.90) and the profit on the futures transactions ($0.25) result in an effective sale at a
price of $3.15 per bushel. However, if the price of wheat had increased instead, the
farmer would have made an excess profit on the actual sale of wheat and had an offsetting
loss on the futures transaction. Therefore, by constructing a perfect hedge, the farmer
can obtain a predetermined price for his goods.
68. See Peck, supra note 51, at 14-17.
69. See Silber, supra note 39, at 86. For example, an arbitrageur who concludes that
wheat contracts traded on the futures markets are relatively expensive in comparison to
the spot market for wheat might purchase and store the "cheap" spot wheat today and
simultaneously sell wheat futures contracts. These transactions virtually "lock-in" a
profit (the difference between the price of the "expensive" wheat futures contracts and
"fairly" priced contracts) and hedge further price changes. When the futures contracts
expire, the arbitrageur fulfills his obligation by delivering the spot wheat, which had been
stored in the interim period, to a location that has been approved by the commodity
1988]
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exposure to price changes.70 They take futures positions (long or short)
in the hope of profiting by correctly anticipating the direction and magni-
tude of price movements.71 Speculators have no involvement in the un-
derlying cash market.72 Large financial institutions frequently assume
both the hedgers' and speculators' roles. 73 Some institutions will com-
bine hedging and speculating: they are risk averse but also willing to act
on price expectations in search of profits.74
Market makers, called locals or scalpers because they trade on the
floor of the exchange for their own account, continuously buy and sell to
take advantage of temporary imbalances in order flow. 75 However, un-
like position traders, locals generally do not hold futures positions open
overnight. Instead, they attempt to buy contracts at the bid price and
sell them at the offer price during the same trading session.76
II. CURRENT USES OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
In 1982, the commodities exchanges introduced a new financial prod-
uct: futures contracts on stock indices. Since that time, institutional in-
vestors managing large stock portfolios have employed innovative,
computer-assisted strategies that use these derivative instruments to im-
plement their investment decisions. Other institutions have become in-
dex arbitrageurs; they recognized that the entry of stock index futures
resulted in similar financial assets being traded in two markets (stock
index contracts on the futures exchanges and the underlying stocks on
the stock exchanges). Until October 19, 1987, these "program trading"
strategies (such as hedging, index arbitrage, and portfolio insurance),
which are the products of innovations in finance and technology, were
exchange. A trader who was long must accept delivery and make payment in full to the
arbitrageur.
The arbitrage of an agricultural commodity between the cash and futures markets oc-
curs infrequently, however, because of the inconvenience of taking actual delivery of a
physical commodity. Another form of arbitrage, known as spreading, is more prevalent.
When both the buy and sell sides are in the futures markets, the transaction is usually
referred to as a spread. For example, an arbitrageur might buy and sell futures contracts
on two different commodity exhanges that trade similar contracts (e.g., buy wheat futures
on the Kansas City Board of Trade and simultaneously sell wheat futures on the Chicago
Board of Trade), expecting to profit from inefficient pricing between the two. Certain
financial futures such as those on Treasury bonds or stock indexes are more easily arbi-
traged with the cash market than other commodities because of the absence of physical
possession and storage problems (for example, book-entry of securities transactions).
70. See R. Fink & R. Feduniak, supra, note 56, at 72.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Silber, supra note 39, at 86.
74. See Kwast, An Overview of Financial Futures and Options in the U.S. Economy, in
Financial Futures and Options in the U.S. Economy 14 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve System 1986).
75. R. Fink & R. Feduniak, supra note 56, at 68.
76. See id.
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generally unknown to most individual investors in the stock market and
misunderstood by many institutions.
A. Stock Index Futures
Although the futures and options markets originally developed in the
agricultural sector, where futures helped farmers insulate themselves
from unanticipated crop price changes,77 today these markets offer non-
agricultural products as well. These include futures on industrial com-
modities, financial instruments, and financial indices. The latest financial
innovation has been the introduction of stock index futures and index
options. Like the Illinois wheat farmer, stock market participants are
exposed to price risks that they might want to avoid. A futures contract
on a stock index serves as a substitute for owning the actual portfolio of
stocks that forms the index. Stock index futures, therefore, can be used
to offset a loss suffered in an investment portfolio or trading account dur-
ing a period of general market decline or to facilitate a purchase or sale of
the many stocks composing an index. These derivative instruments,
therefore, allow investors to adjust the exposure of their portfolios to
fluctuations in the general level of stock market prices.
Although many different stock index futures contracts are traded on
various exchanges, the most significant contract is the Standard & Poor's
("S&P") 500, which was introduced by the Index and Options Market of
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1982.78 The S&P 500 futures con-
tract is based on the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Index, which is
constructed and maintained by the Standard & Poor's Corporation.7 9
The S&P 500 index is the most widely known and quoted index next to
the Dow Jones Industrial Average,80 and is generally recognized as the
benchmark against which the performance of portfolio managers is mea-
sured.81 The S&P 500 contract is so popular that, for example, during
1986 its daily dollar volume of transactions was approximately 60 per-
cent greater than the value of actual stock trading on the New York
Stock Exchange. 2
77. See supra note 67.
78. See Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 8.
79. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Using S&P 500 Stock Index Futures and Op-
tions 4-5 (1987).
80. When someone asks, "How is the market doing?," the reply is almost always in
terms of the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA"). It is the "average" common stock
price of thirty industrial "blue-chip" companies. In 1928, Dow Jones & Co. began
changing the divisor because of stock splits, stock dividends, etc. Accordingly, since 1928
the divisor for the DJIA is no longer the number of stocks in the average. As a result, it
is not a true arithmetic average. See N. Weiner, Stock Index Futures: A Guide for Trad-
ers, Investors and Analysts 37-38 (1984).
81. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 5. Additionally, it is also
used by the United States Commerce Department as one of the components of the Index
of Leading Indicators. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study VI, at 18.
82. See Merrick, Fact and Fantasy About Stock Index Futures Program Trading, Bus.
Rev., Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 13.
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The S&P 500 index, on which the S&P futures contract is based, is
constructed from the stock prices of 500 different companies--400 indus-
trials, 40 utilities, 20 transportation companies and 40 financial institu-
tions.83 The market value of the 500 firms in the index "is equal to
approximately 80 percent of the value of all stocks traded on the New
York Stock Exchange."'8 4 It is a capitalization-weighted index; accord-
ingly, the total market value, and not simply the share price of each
stock, is considered in the computation of the index." Hence, "[e]ach
component stock's price is multiplied by the number of common shares
outstanding for that company, and the resulting market values are to-
taled."86 This aggregate market value is compared to the market value of
the 500 stocks during the base period to derive the index value.87 Since
the index is weighted by the outstanding shares of each company, a price
change in one company will influence the index in proportion to the
stock's relative market value.88
Stock index futures contracts89 are similar to futures on agricultural
products, except for two important differences.9" First, strictly speaking,
there is no cash market for index futures.91 For example, the underlying
commodity for wheat futures contracts is wheat. However, a stock index
cannot be purchased or sold; only the individual securities composing the
index can be bought or sold.92 Second, unlike traditional futures con-
tracts that are settled on expiration by physical delivery of, and payment
83. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 4. As of April 6, 1988, Stan-
dard & Poor may vary the size of these categories to promote flexibility in the composi-
tion of the overall market measure. See S&P is Adjusting Its 500 Stock Mix to Add
Flexibility, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 51, col. 3. The 500 companies composing the
index are either listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exhange
or traded over-the-counter.
84. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 4.
85. See A. Loosigian, supra note 23, at 16.
86. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 4.
87. The base value is the average market value of those 500 stocks during the years
from 1941 to 1943, and that value was set equal to ten. See N. Weiner, supra note 80, at
42. The base value is adjusted for consistency when there are stock splits or dividends,
mergers, acquisitions, or when stocks are added or deleted from the index. See Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 5.
88. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 5.
89. The value of the S&P 500 index futures contract is calculated by multiplying the
futures index (not the spot index) by $500. See id. For example, a futures index of
300.00 represents $150,000 of market value in the 500 component stocks. If the futures
price rises one index point to 301.00, traders who are long will have a gain of $500 on
each contract and those who are short will have a corresponding $500 loss.
90. Cf Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 7. The Katzenbach Study cites two addi-
tional differences: (1) the main participants in agricultural futures market are producers
and users (e.g., farmers and grain merchants) of the underlying commodity, while in
index futures markets, there are only users (investors) of the stocks that compose the
index; and (2) these investors use futures only to hedge against unfavorable price move-
ments, while participants in agricultural commodities hedge against upward and down-
ward price shifts. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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for, the underlying commodities, index futures are settled in cash; no
actual shares of stock are transferred.93 For both traditional and index
futures, "longs" and "shorts" settle profits and losses daily through the
transfer of variation margin until the expiration date of the contract.94
In the case of index futures, on the expiration date long and short inves-
tors realize their profits and losses in cash instead of by delivery.95 Final
cash settlement for the S&P 500 index contract is based on the difference
between the future's settlement price on the last day of trading under the
contract and the opening value of the index the next morning.96
The value of a stock index futures contract generally moves with
changes in the underlying spot index value (which reflects price changes
of component stocks), but the futures price is usually different from the
spot price.97 This difference is known as the basis. One theory explain-
ing the equilibrium relationship between futures and cash market prices
is based on the cost-of-carry model.9" This theory suggests that the the-
oretical "fair value" of a stock index futures contract equals the spot
index value plus the net cost of carrying the stocks representing the index
until the maturity of the futures contract.99 The holder of the actual
underlying stocks receives dividends on them, but also incurs a financing
cost because he must pay full value for the stocks or pay interest on the
margined amount."° While the futures contract holder receives no divi-
93. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 5.
94. See D. Luskin, Index Options & Futures 4 (1987).
95. See id.
96. See R. Fink & R. Feduniak, supra note 56, at 504. Until early 1987, S&P 500
index contracts were settled based on the closing value of the underlying index on the last
trading day of the futures contract. In April 1987, the NYSE and CME agreed to change
this procedure in response to concerns regarding NYSE market volatility associated with
so-called triple witching hours (i.e., the last hour of trading on the four Fridays each year
when stock options, stock index options and stock index futures all expire simultane-
ously). The new settlement method, which allows the NYSE specialists to handle order
imbalances more effectively, is based on the opening value of the S&P index on the day
following the last trading day. Since the change, triple witching hours have not exhibited
excessive market volatility. See Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 21-22.
97. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 6.
98. See Kwast, supra note 74, at 11.
99. See Stoll & Whaley, Program Trading and Expiration-Day Effect, Fin. Analysts
J., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 16-17. A simple model of the fair value of a stock index futures
contract ("F*") that does not incorporate transaction costs is given by: F* = S X (1 + r
- d), where "S" is the spot index value, "r" is the riskless rate of interest for borrowing
funds over the life of the futures contract (e.g., the yield on Treasury bills), and "d" is the
rate at which dividend income is expected to accrue on an investment in the underlying
index over the same contract life. See id.; see also Modest, On the Pricing of Stock Index
Futures, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Summer 1984, at 51. For example, if the annual yield on
Treasury bills is 7% (or 1.75% over three months), the dividend yield is 4% (or 1% over
three months), and the spot value of the S&P 500 Index is 240.00, then the fair value of
an index futures contract with three months to expiration would equal 241.80 (240.00 x
(1 + (0.0175 - 0.01)). Thus, the basis is 1.80 index points (241.80 - 240.00). At the
expiration date, the cash settlement feature of stock index contracts ensures that the fair
futures price equals the spot index (F* = S) because the effective interest rate and divi-
dend yield are equal to zero. See Stoll & Whaley, supra, at 16-17.
100. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 79, at 6.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
dends, he also does not incur financing costs. Indeed, because the re-
quired margin deposit is relatively small, he can invest the remainder (of
the amount he would have otherwise paid for the underlying stocks) in
other earning assets, such as Treasury bills.1" 1 Since yields on Treasury
bills have generally exceeded dividend yields on stocks, the net cost of
carry has been positive. Consequently, in equilibrium, the fair value of
an S&P 500 stock index futures contract is greater than the spot index
value, but this difference erodes as the contract approaches its last day of
trading, at which time the two values converge. 10 2
Prior to the expiration of a stock index futures contract, the current
value of the contract may not equal the fair value of the stock underlying
the contract. 103 Consequently, there are arbitrage opportunities between
the stock and futures markets, which theoretically can yield profit with-
out risk. 1" For example, if the current value of an S&P 500 index fu-
tures contract exceeds its fair value (that is, futures are priced at a
premium), an arbitrageur would simultaneously buy the stocks compos-
ing the index (using the proceeds from borrowing at the risk-free interest
rate) and sell the futures contract. 105 In this case, arbitrage forces up the
index stock prices and brings down the index futures price.10 6 As a re-
sult, the process continues until the cost of carry relationship is satis-
fied.107 At the expiration of the contracts, the arbitrageur can unwind his
positions (sell the stocks and settle the futures) and receive a riskless
profit (some rate of return greater than that of a "riskless" instrument
such as a Treasury bill) whether prices have increased, decreased or re-
101. See id.
102. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text; supra note 96.
103. See Finnerty & Park, How to Profit From Program Trading, J. Portfolio Mgmt.,
Winter 1988, at 45-46. At expiration, stock index futures contracts are settled at the spot
index value, see supra note 99 and accompanying text, and thus the fair value always
equals the current value. Until this convergence, the current value of an index futures
contract is determined by the forces of supply and demand. The prices of individual
stocks (and thus the spot index value) are also determined by supply and demand. How-
ever, these two sets of forces do not necessarily operate to maintain an equilibrium net
cost of carry relationship between the futures and stock markets. After all, they are
separate markets; for example, heavy buying or selling pressure in the futures market can
force stock index futures contracts above or below fair value if there is not an equivalent
force in the stock market.
104. See Stoll & Whaley, supra note 99, at 17.
105. See id. at 16-17. In reality, an arbitrageur would not arbitrage futures against
stocks if there was only a very small mispricing between the two markets. Transaction
costs (such as fees, commissions, and market impact) incurred by trading, affect the prof-
itability of arbitrage. These costs cause the fair value of a stock index futures contract to
take on a range rather than a singular value. See Gould, Stock Index Futures: The Arbi-
trage Cycle and Portfolio Insurance, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 48. For instance,
if an arbitrageur incurs transaction costs eqivalent to 5.00 index points, he would not
arbitrage stock index futures against stock unless the current value of a stock index fu-
tures contract was trading 5.00 index points above or below the fair value (determined
without considering transaction costs) because it would not be profitable.
106. See Silber. supra note 39, at 83, 88.
107. See id. at 88.
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mained at the same level. 108 Because the futures contracts are settled at
the spot index value, the arbitrageur is unaffected by the manner in
which the position in the index stocks is unwound, as long as the opening
prices on each of the stocks is received. 10 9 Thus, the arbitrageur's profit-
oriented reaction to mispricing between the futures and stock markets
moves the markets toward an equilibrium price.110 Arbitrage maintains
the link between index futures and the underlying stocks composing the
index.111
B. Program Trading
Program trading refers to the buying or selling of a large number of
stocks (called a "basket") simultaneously. For many years prior to the
introduction of derivative instruments, institutional investors used pro-
gram trading to adjust the asset-mix of their portfolios.' 12 However,
stock index futures have facilitated the growth of program trading by
reducing its cost. 1 3 Moreover, the trend toward investments in index
funds has encouraged portfolio size trading. Program trading has been
most closely associated with index arbitrage, but it is actually a generic
term that encompasses several trading strategies, including asset alloca-
tion and hedging,114 portfolio insurance,'15 and index arbitrage." 6 These
strategies require complex computer analyses. Not surprisingly, im-
provements in communications and data processing technologies have
assisted the rapid execution of program trades." 17
Institutional investors trade portfolios of stocks in order to achieve
higher short-run risk-adjusted returns on their investments. Modem
portfolio theory indicates that investors in the stock market face two
types of risk: unsystematic and systematic." 8 Unsystematic risk is the
risk associated with a specific company or industry." 9 The stock price of
an individual firm is influenced by such events as lawsuits, strikes, new
products, the winning or losing of major contracts, or other occurrences
108. See Stoll & Whaley, supra note 99, at 20.
109. See id.
110. See Staff of the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, Congressional Research Service, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Pro-
gram Trading: Public Policy Aspects of Index Arbitrage 5 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Congressional Research Service].
11. See Merrick, supra note 82, at 13, 15-16.
112. See Heston, How Index Contracts Have Changed Program Trading, Futures, Feb.
1987, at 46, 55-56.
113. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
117. See H. Stoll & R. Whaley, Expiration Day Effects of Index Options and Futures
(Monograph Series in Finance and Economics 1986); infra notes 118-21 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See Jones, The Uses and Users of the Stock Index Futures Markets, in Stock Index
Futures 159 (F. Fabozzi & G. Kipnis eds. 1984).
119. See id.
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unique to that firm. Because the events affecting a particular stock are
generally random, their effects on overall return can be greatly reduced
by diversification, the purchase of securities of firms not affected by the
same variables.2 0 Accordingly, unexpected price increases of one com-
pany's stock could be offset by unexpected losses in another.121 Unsys-
tematic risk decreases quickly as stocks are added to a portfolio. 122
Firm-specific risk, therefore, can be virtually eliminated by properly di-
versifying a portfolio of stocks.
Although diversification works well at reducing unsystematic risk, it is
not effective against systematic (or market) risk, which is associated with
the overall movement of the stock market.2 3 Market risk stems from
factors that affect all firms simultaneously, such as inflation, recession
and interest rates. Hence, the systematic risk of stock market participa-
tion cannot be reduced by careful stock selection. As a result, investors
who engage in a market timing strategy and who perceive a downturn
may sell their long positions (get out of the stock market) and purchase
money market instruments.
Many investment managers are willing to assume unsystematic risk by
not diversifying. They actively trade securities in an attempt to achieve
above-average returns on a risk-adjusted basis.12 4 In other words, active
managers believe that they can beat the market averages consistently.
Such a strategy is expensive to implement; costs are incurred researching
for mispriced stocks and transactions costs charged for buying and sell-
ing individual securities.
Research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s indicated that active man-
agement fails to achieve higher returns and lead to skepticism about the
effectiveness of active management strategies.'25 Additionally, since the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires
pension fund managers to employ "care, skill, prudence, and diligence,"
achieving diversification at a low cost seems necessary.' 26
This has led some institutional investors to adopt passive portfolio
management strategies. Index funds present a passive approach to port-
folio management' 27 because no individual stock selection analysis is re-
quired. 128 Managers purchase the component stocks of the index in the
120. See id. at 160.
121. See id.
122. See R. Fink & R. Feduniak, supra note 56, at 506.
123. See id.
124. See Fabozzi & Garlicki, Creating an Index Fund, in Stock Index Futures 199,
200-01 (F. Fabozzi & G. Kipnis eds. 1984).
125. See id. at 199-201.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982). See Fabozzi & Garlicki, supra note 124, at 201. ERISA
requires that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties... by diversifying the investments of
the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is
clearly prudent not to do so .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
127. See Fabozzi & Garlicki, supra note 124, at 202.
128. See id.
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correct proportions in order to replicate its rate of return. 129 The growth
of these indexed assets has been phenomenal.13 In 1980, indexed assets
accounted for a total of $9 billion,1 ' but by May 1987, United States
pension funds had over $187 billion indexed, of which $124 billion
tracked United States equity indices.13 2
Because equities are only one form of investment, some money manag-
ers use a tactical asset allocation strategy.'33 They balance their invest-
ments in stocks, bonds, and money market instruments depending on
relative returns and risks.134 These institutional investors believe that
they can outperform the stock market by proper timing, leaving the mar-
ket when yields on other investment vehicles are higher. This strategy
requires an efficient method of moving in and out of a stock portfolio,
which might be an indexed portfolio.
C. Program Trading with Stock Index Futures
Because transactions costs in the futures market are significantly lower
than those in the stock market, stock index futures contracts are fre-
quently used for portfolio allocation.' 35 Transactions costs can be sepa-
rated into four categories: fees and commissions, market-impact,
leverage and regulatory constraints. 136 First, the commissions and fees
associated with index futures are between 5 and 10 percent of those for
trading in securities. 137 To illustrate, the commission cost of purchasing
$120 million of the stocks underlying the S&P 500 is approximately
$161,000; in contrast, the same market exposure could be achieved by
purchasing 800 S&P 500 index contracts, but the commission would be
only $10,000.138 This difference reflects several factors, the primary one
being that 500 separate transactions would be made in the stock market,
while in the futures market, there could conceivably be only one trade.
Second, the market-impact costs (the price discount or premium in-
curred to get the trade done), as measured by the spread between bid and
offer prices, are lower with index futures than with the actual stocks. 1 39
Spreads arise because of the forces of supply and demand in the markets.
129. See id. at 202-03.
130. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-3.
131. See id. (citing Christman, Indexed Assets up 70% in 1985, Pensions & Investment
Age, Dec. 23, 1985, at 6).
132. See id. (Citing Berkowitz, Indexed Assets Top $187 Billion, Pensions & Invest-
ment Age, July 13, 1987, at 3).
133. See Karier & Givant, Tactical Allocation Passes Market Test, Pensions & Invest-
ment Age, Nov. 2, 1987, at 6.
134. See id.
135. See Kling, supra note 53, at 41.
136. See id. at 44.
137. See Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 8.
138. See id. at 8, fig. 2.
139. See id. The bid price is the price that a potential buyer is willing to pay for a
security; conversely, the offer (or ask) price is the price at which a security is offered for
sale. The difference between the highest bid and the lowest offer is known as the spread.
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For example, securities that are neither widely held nor actively traded
will have relatively larger spreads. On the other hand, competitive trad-
ing by many market participants produces narrow bid-offer spreads.
While the aggregate spread might be $520,000 for the purchase or sale of
a $120 million portfolio of S&P 500 stocks, in the futures market the
impact would amount to only $20,000.140
Third, there is a lower opportunity cost of obtaining leverage in the
futures market than through transactions in the stock market. This lev-
erage derives from two sources--cash settlement and margins."' Be-
cause index futures are settled in cash instead of by actual delivery or
payment for the underlying stocks, no costs are associated with obtaining
or paying for and then transferring the underlying stocks in the requisite
amounts. 14 2 These expenses can be substantial for transactions involving
broad indices such as the S&P 500. Equally important is the fact that the
opportunity cost of an initial margin deposit is lower in the futures mar-
ket. For example, with stock index futures contracts, an investor could
take a $15 million position in the stock market by depositing only $1.5
million (assuming the margin requirement is $15,000 per contract). 143 In
the stock market, the investor would have had to put up $7.5 million (an
additional $6 million) to control the same amount of stock. 1" Hence,
the initial margin levels for stock index futures are lower than those for
the underlying stocks. 141
Finally, although there are various regulatory constraints in both the
futures and stock markets, the short-sale restriction in the stock market
is notable because of its absence in the futures market. In essence, this
regulation-the so-called "up-tick" rule-requires that the short-sale of a
stock, the sale of a security that is not owned at the time of the transac-
tion, take place at a price above the last trade. 146 No similar rule in the
140. See id. at 8, fig. 3.
141. See id. at 8.
142. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-19.
143. Margin requirements are set by futures exchanges and clearing houses as absolute
amounts. Generally, the required original margins are approximately 10 percent of the
contract value.
144. Under Regulation T, the margin requirement for investors in stocks is 50 percent
of the stock's current market value. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.18 (1988). However, for securi-
ties broker-dealers trading for their own account, margin is generally between 20 and 25
percent because of exemptions for certain special purpose loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 221.5
(1988); Sofianos, Margin Requirements on Equity Instruments, Fed. Res. Bank N.Y.Q.
Rev., Summer 1988, at 47, 51. Brokers or dealers have implicit margin requirements
under the Securities and Exchange Commmission's net capital rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (1988), which prohibits indebtedness from exceeding a computed amount.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64 for a discussion of the difference be-
tween the term "margin" in the futures and stock markets. While initial margins may be
lower for stock index futures contracts, after considering the effect of variation (or main-
tenance) margin pays and collects resulting from the daily mark-to-market of open fu-
tures contracts, the overall margin requirement may be equal to that of stocks. See infra
text accompanying notes 336-44.
146. See A. Pessin, Fundamentals of the Securities Industry 237 (1985). The short sale
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futures market prevents the sale of an index contract without owning the
underlying component stocks of the index. 147 Consequently, it is easier
to sell short on an equivalent stock portfolio in the futures market.
1. Asset Allocation and Hedging
The lower transactions costs associated with stock index futures con-
tracts enable institutions to hedge their equity investment more effi-
ciently. Like a wheat farmer, an institutional investor can implement a
hedging strategy to protect itself from a decline in price. If a portfolio
manager with a diversified portfolio of stocks believes the market will
decline, he can sell the shares and use the proceeds to purchase Treasury
bills. However, selling an entire portfolio at once is an expensive propo-
sition, especially when the manager expects to repurchase the shares in
the near future when the market turns upward. The same yield might be
achieved less expensively by keeping the stock positions and selling S&P
500 index futures contracts against them. This strategy is called non-
invasive hedging because the market component of risk in the portfolio is
removed without disturbing the stocks themselves.
A simple example will illustrate the principles. 4 Suppose an investor
owns a diversified portfolio worth $1,200,000, but he expects the market
to fall 15 percent over the next three months. Let us assume that the
annual dividend yield on the portfolio is 4 percent, the annual yield on
Treasury bills is 7 percent, and the current (or spot) S&P 500 index value
is 240.00. By selling ten S&P 500 Index futures contracts at 241.80 (their
fair value) 149 and holding them until expiration, the investor will earn the
Treasury bill rate over three months instead of losing 15 percent.150
By selling futures, however, the investor has not completely eliminated
risk; rather, he has substituted what is known as basis risk for market
risk. Basis risk is the risk that the stock index futures contracts are not
must be executed at a price that constitutes a plus tick or a zero plus tick. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10a-1 (1988); A. Pessin, supra, at 240-42.
147. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-24.
148. See generally D. Luskin, supra note 94, at 256-63.
149. See supra note 99.
150. To illustrate:
Value of stocks at end of three months $1,020,000
Value of stocks at beginning of period $1,200,000
Loss from stocks ($180,000)
Expiration value of futures
(204.00 X $500 X 10) ($1,020,000)
Initial value of futures
(241.80 X $500 X 10) 1,209,000
Profit from futures $189,000
Dividends received $12,000
TOTAL PROFIT $21,000
RETURN ON INVESTMENT OVER THREE MONTHS 1.75%
(7% annually)
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priced at their fair value.151 For example, if the ten contracts were ini-
tially sold when they were underpriced (that is, at a discount to fair
value, such as 237.60),'52 the portfolio would be underhedged. Conse-
quently, the investor would earn less than the Treasury bill rate and
might possibly suffer a loss.'53
Assuming the futures are fairly priced, by timing the market correctly,
an investor can efficiently reduce his equity exposure, avoid a loss, and
earn a risk-free return. If, however, he was wrong and the market rose
15 percent, losses in index futures would offset any gains in the stocks; as
a result, the portfolio would still only yield the Treasury bill rate (7 per-
cent). This strategy creates a "synthetic" money market instrument: the
Treasury bill.
With futures contracts, an equity investment can be reallocated to
other financial instruments as well. In particular, a portfolio manager
can effectively invest in Treasury bonds by selling stock index futures
contracts against a stock portfolio and buying Treasury bond futures
contracts. An investor might prefer this strategy when yields on long-
term Treasury bonds exceed' those of short-term money market instru-
ments. Thus, the availability of stock index futures and other financial
futures contracts allow institutional investors to hedge their stock portfo-
lios and reallocate their investment to other financial instruments.
2. Portfolio Insurance
In the hedging strategy discussed above, the process of risk transfer
creates an opportunity cost of lost upside potential in the stock market.
While a perfect hedge can avoid a loss when stock prices fall, it also
precludes a profit when prices increase. Some institutional investors are
willing to pay a fee to limit downside risk to a specified minimum floor
151. See Figlewski, Hedging Performance and Basis Risk in Stock Index Futures, 39 J.
Fin. 657, 657-58 (1984).
152. Stock index futures do not necessarily trade at their fair value. See supra note
103.
153. To illustrate:
Value of stocks at end of three months $1,020,000
Value of stocks at beginning of period $1,200,000
Loss from stocks ($180,000)
Expiration value of futures
(204.00 X $500 X 10) ($1,020,000)
Initial value of futures
(237.60 X $500 X 10) $1,188,000
Profit from futures $168,000
Dividends received $12,000
TOTAL PROFIT (LOSS) $0
RETURN ON INVESTMENT OVER THREE MONTHS 0.00%
If the ten stock index futures contracts were sold at a value of less than 237.60, the
investor would have suffered a loss. On the other hand, if the investor had sold the stock
instead, she could have invested the proceeds in Treasury bills earning an annual yield of
7 percent (or 1.75 percent for the three month period).
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but nevertheless participate in upside gains. Portfolio insurance is not an
insurance policy,"5 4 but a dynamic strategy seeking to protect against loss
without eliminating profit opportunities. 155
Portfolio insurance, also known as dynamic hedging, is an asset alloca-
tion strategy that continually rebalances a portfolio between a risky in-
vestment and a riskless investment so that the portfolio's total return
does not fall below some specified minimum over a given time period.156
As the portfolio's value rises above the value associated with the mini-
mum required return, the asset mix of the portfolio is gradually shifted
toward the risky investment. However, as the portfolio's value falls,
funds are gradually shifted to the riskless asset to protect the portfolio
from falling below the minimum required return. 57 For example, an
institutional investor following a portfolio insurance program would sell
some of its portfolio of stocks and buy Treasury bills in reaction to a
falling stock market, but purchase stocks and sell Treasury bills in a ris-
ing market.15 8
As with static hedging, this dynamic strategy can be implemented with
less expense and more speed with stock index futures.1 59 A stock portfo-
lio can be systematically rebalanced by selling stock index futures (in-
154. Although portfolio insurance is generally not "true" insurance, such a product
does exist. Aetna Life developed the Guaranteed Equity Management ("GEM") con-
tract, which guarantees at least a specified minimum return at the end of the covered
period. See Tate, The Insurance Company Guarantee, in Portfolio Insurance: A Guide
to Dynamic Hedging 183 (D. Luskin ed. 1988).
155. For a discussion of the origin of portfolio insurance, see Leland & Rubenstein,
The Evolution of Portfolio Insurance, in Portfolio Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic Hedg-
ing 3 (D. Luskin ed. 1988). Dynamic strategies, unlike fixed or static strategies, reallo-
cate assets in response to relative changes in the markets for those assets. Portfolio
insurance is the most widely applied dynamic allocation strategy. See Grannis, Applica-
tions of Dynamic Strategies, in Portfolio Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic Hedging 49-52
(D. Luskin ed. 1988).
156. See Ferguson, How to Beat the S&P 500 (Without Losing Sleep), Fin. Analysts J.,
Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 37, 39, reprinted in Portfolio Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic Hedg-
ing 62 (D. Luskin ed. 1988). An investor would specify a zero percent minimum return
to ensure that there will be a probability of zero that the return on her portfolio will be
less than zero percent. Similarly, an investor who is willing to incur no more than a 5
percent loss on his portfolio during the investment period would specify a minimum re-
turn of negative 5 percent. By analogy to real insurance, a minimum return of less than
zero percent (e.g., where an investor is willing to risk a loss) represents a deductible. See
Clarke & Arnott, Patterns of Reward for Portfolio Insurance, in Portfolio Insurance: A
Guide to Dynamic Hedging 31 (D. Luskin ed. 1988).
157. The minimum required return can be no greater than the expected return from
the riskless asset. See Ferguson, supra note 156, at 37, 39.
158. Portfolio insurance is a strategy that reacts to price movements, but does not
anticipate them.
159. Conventional dynamic hedging, which involves buying and selling stocks and
Treasury bills, generates transactions costs of 0.56 percent of the spot index price per
year. If index options are used instead, the annual cost is approximately 0.48 percent of
the spot index price. Dynamic hedging with futures is the cheapest-only 0.18 percent of
the spot index price. See Rubenstein, Alternative Paths to Portfolio Insurance, Fin. Ana-
lysts J., July-Aug. 1985, at 50, reprinted in Portfolio Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic
Hedging 23 (D. Luskin ed. 1988). As a result, most portfolio insurance programs are
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stead of selling the actual stock) after a market decline and by easing
those positions when the market advances. Such a strategy dynamically
shifts the investor's exposure between stocks and Treasury bills.
The computation of when and by how much to change the portfolio's
allocation in order to achieve a specified minimum return is based on
option pricing theory. 160 A put option on a diversified stock portfolio
with a strike price equal to a minimum required return can be syntheti-
cally replicated by continuously adjusting the market exposure (for ex-
ample, selling and buying S&P 500 index futures contracts).1 6 ' One
measure of the cost of portfolio insurance-the "premium" paid for the
"synthetic" put option-is the return differential by which the total re-
turn lags behind the performance of the risky component. 162 In effect,
the cost of portfolio insurance equals the extent to which the strategy
fails to capture up-turns in the stock market. The investor, therefore,
pays for eliminating the risk of losses below the specified minimum re-
turn by accepting an increased likelihood of modest returns.163
Portfolio insurance is not a riskless strategy. First, as the volatility of
the stock market increases, the cost of portfolio insurance will also in-
implemented with futures. See Martin, Stock Index and Financial Futures, in Portfolio
Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic Hedging 138 (D. Luskin ed. 1988).
160. See Ferguson, supra note 156, at 39; Granito, The Intellectual Origins of Portfolio
Insurance, in Portfolio Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic Hedging 197-98, 204-05 (D.
Luskin ed. 1988); see also Rubenstein & Leland, Replicating Options with Positions in
Stocks and Cash, Fin. Analysts J., July-Aug. 198 1, at 63, reprinted in Portfolio Insurance:
A Guide to Dynamic Hedging 294 (D. Luskin ed. 1988) (characterization of modem
option pricing theory); Sloan & Stem, How Vo = VN (dl) - E/e"N(d2) led to Black
Monday, Forbes, Jan. 25, 1988, at 55 (overvFew--TW-o ortfolio insuranice led to the
market crash). The seminal articles developing the theory are Black & Scholes, The Pric-
ing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637 (1973), reprinted in Portfolio
Insurance: A Guide to Dynamic Hedging 226 (D. Luskin ed. 1988), and Merton, Theory
of Rational Option Pricing, 4 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 141 (1973). A discussion of
option pricing is beyond the scope of this Article. Because of the complexity of financial
models and the amount of information that must be processed, computers are important
tools in performing the required calculations.
161. See Granito, supra note 160, at 204.
162. See Ferguson, supra note 156, at 39.
163. See Clarke & Amott, supra note 156, at 30. For example, assume that an institu-
tion wants to invest in a diversified portfolio of stocks and wants to avoid a loss over one
year. Assume in addition that the S&P 500 index's expected return is 16%, the volatility
of the S&P 500 index is 20% annually, and the interest rate is 10%. A dynamic hedging
program that incorporates these assumptions will call for an initial portfolio allocation to
S&P 500 stocks of 59.7% and an allocation to Treasury bills of 40.3%. This allocation is
achieved by fully investing in stocks and selling S&P 500 index futures against them. If
the S&P 500 index rises, the program will call for a greater allocation to stocks (which
can be achieved by offsetting some of the short futures position with purchases of futures
contracts), and because only part of the portfolio is allocated to stocks, the return of the
total portfolio will fail to capture the full appreciation of stocks. Therefore, if the S&P
500 index rose 35% over the year, the return on an insured portfolio would only be about
28.9%. Accordingly, the upside capture is 95.5% (1.289/1.350). Hence, in return for
the assurance that the portfolio would not lose money, the institution passed up the op-
portunity to earn an additional 6.1% without insurance. See Ferguson, supra note 156, at
40.
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crease. 1" When the stock market drops, portfolio insurance sells; when
the market advances, portfolio insurance buys. 6 ' Accordingly, higher
volatility generates more trading, which produces greater transactions
costs. Second, portfolio insurance is based on the assumption that the
index price will fluctuate smoothly. 166 However, if there are discontinui-
ties in stock or futures prices because of trading halts, proper portfolio
adjustments may be impossible. 167 Furthermore, portfolio insurance as-
sumes that the market for stock index futures contracts remains liquid
even when stock prices are falling. That is, there must be a sufficient
number of buyers of stock index futures contracts such that the portfolio
insurers can sell futures contracts at a fair price. If sufficient buying
power does not exist, there can be no "insurance." Finally, mispricing
securities can make dynamic hedging unexpectedly very expensive. If
the market declines, but S&P 500 index futures contracts are priced at a
discount to stocks (below fair value), it will become expensive to sell
stock index futures and thus implement a dynamic hedging strategy.16 8
3. Index Arbitrage
Index arbitrage is another program trading strategy. Investors using
index arbitrage attempt to profit from occasional mispricings between
stock index futures and the underlying basket of stocks. If the prices of
equivalent financial assets that are traded in different markets are known,
then arbitrageurs act on their knowledge to earn profits when the prices
diverge. Arbitrageurs are only concerned with basis and not with the
intrinsic value of stocks. 169 For example, if futures were priced at a pre-
mium to their fair value, and thus at a premium to stock price, an index
arbitrageur would simultaneously sell index futures and buy an
equivalent amount of the basket of stocks underlying the index in the
same proportion that the stocks are weighted in the index (long arbi-
trage). The arbitrageurs would continue to sell index futures (forcing the
price of stock index futures down) and buy the underlying basket of
stocks (forcing stock prices up) until the disparity vanishes. Thus, index
arbitrageurs make the markets efficient by recognizing mispricing be-
164. See Clarke & Arnott, supra note 156, at 31.
165. See id. at 41.
166. See D. Luskin, supra note 94, at 286; Rubenstein, Portfolio Insurance and the
Market Crash, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 38, 40.
167. See D. Luskin, supra note 94, at 286; Rubenstein, supra note 166, at 38, 40.
168. See CME Report, supra note 5, at 26; Hill, Jain & Wood, Insurance: Volatility
Risk and Futures Mispricing, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Winter 1988, at 23; Donnelly, Is Portfo-
lio Insurance All It's Cracked Up to Be?, Institutional Investor, Nov. 1986, at 132; Ruben-
stein, supra note 166, at 38; Voorhees, Can Portfolio Insurance Make a Comeback?,
Institutional Investor, Jan. 1988, at 58; see also supra note 152-53 and accompanying text.
Selling a low priced futures contract can lead to the possibility of "missing the floor" (for
example, not achieving the specified minimum return). To avoid such a result, a portfolio
insurer should sell the actual (relatively higher priced) stock instead. See CME Report,
supra note 5, at 26.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
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tween the markets and moving them toward an equilibrium price.170
Index arbitrage maintains the link between the futures and stock mar-
kets and consequently benefits market users. 171 As previously described,
institutional investors attempting to time the market or dynamically
hedge their portfolios using index futures may encounter a basis risk be-
cause of inefficient pricing of futures and stocks. The arbitrage process,
by keeping the futures and stock markets aligned,' 72 reduces some of the
uncertainty borne by users of futures markets.'73
Index arbitrage affects stock prices because the futures market reacts
more rapidly to new information than does the stock market. The lower
transactions costs of index futures allow institutional investors to make
portfolio adjustments more inexpensively than by trading the underlying
stocks. 174 Consequently, changing investors' expectations will be more
quickly reflected in the price of an index futures contract than in stock
prices. This discrepancy between the markets creates arbitrage opportu-
nities. For example, if futures begin to trade at a discount to stock, arbi-
trageurs will buy futures and sell short stocks (short arbitrage), which
will lead to a fall in the stock market. Index arbitrage transmits negative
expectations in the futures market to the underlying stocks. This rela-
tionship-index futures price movements affecting stock prices-has
been referred to as "the tail wagging the dog."' 75 Over time, the swings
in the stock market will become less pronounced as additional arbi-
trageurs enter the markets, but arbitrage opportunities will persist be-
cause of the difference in transactions costs between the two markets.17
6
Index arbitrage generates nearly riskless returns in excess of the yields
on Treasury bills. Drawing from the numbers developed during the dis-
cussion of asset allocation and hedging, an arbitrageur could earn riskless
profit if futures were not fairly valued. 177 For example, if index futures
were trading at discount, 237.00 instead of the "fair" 241.80, an arbi-
trageur would purchase the "cheap" index futures contracts and sell
short the relatively expensive stocks composing the index, investing the
proceeds in Treasury bills.'17
170. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 110, at 5.
171. See H. Stoll & R. Whaley, supra note 117, at 22.
172. See Merrick, supra note 82, at 13, 17-18.
173. See id. at 18.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
175. Kerwin, Is the Tail Wagging the Dog?, Barron's, Dec. 10, 1984, at 11.
176. Cf H. Stoll & R. Whaley, supra note 117, at 28; Merrick, supra note 82, at 19-21.
177. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
178. One form of index arbitrage is known as index substitution, which involves arbi-
trage against an already existing portfolio of stocks. Institutional investors such as pen-
sion and mutual fund managers are therefore likely candidates to use index substitution.
In the example developed during the discussion of asset allocation and hedging, it was
assumed that the investor sold index futures at their fair value. Hence, the portfolio
manager ensured a risk-free return equal to the Treasury bill yield. If futures were under-
priced, the investor would earn less than the yield on Treasury bills or even lose money.
What if index futures were over-priced instead (i.e., they are sold at a price in excess of
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Although index arbitrage is referred to as a strategy that generates
"riskless" profits, some risks actually are involved. One risk is that the
dividend yield on stocks will not develop as expected. 179 If companies
increase or cut dividends unexpectedly, the fair value relationship
changes. Thus, if dividends are cut, the long arbitrageur's return will
also be reduced. Another risk is tracking error. 8 ' Arbitrageurs fre-
quently purchase or sell a basket of stocks that does not include all the
component stocks in the index. Thus, an arbitrageur exposes himself to
risk because the futures contracts do not perfectly hedge price changes in
the basket of stocks. Finally, the arbitrageur takes the risk that the trans-
action will not be executed at the proper prices to make the strategy
profitable. Trade execution of the index futures contract is relatively
simple. An arbitrageur can buy or sell ten contracts simply by calling his
trader in the pits. However, the other side of the transaction-stocks-is
more difficult. Trading ten S&P 500 index contracts requires the
equivalent of selling or buying thousands of shares of 500 different stocks
at once. Moreover, for profitable arbitrage, the stock transactions must
be done at certain prices. Advances in transaction processing technology
permit this to occur.
4. Technology-The Automation of the New York Stock Exchange
In the 1960s, orders to purchase or sell stocks were listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).18 1 A customer would call a registered
representative at a brokerage firm's branch office and place the order to
buy or sell.' 8I In turn, the order would be telephoned to the firm's order
desk. The order desk would then telephone the order to the firm's booth
on the floor of the NYSE, 183 and a floor broker' 84 would take the order
(a physical paper ticket) to the trading post'85 for that listed stock and
their fair value)? For example, if the ten futures contracts were initially sold at a value of
244.00, the investor would have earned an additional $11,000. This would result in a
three month return of 2.67%, or 10.67% annually, which is clearly superior to earning an
annual Treasury bill yield of 7%.
179. See Heston, How Dividends Affect Futures-Cash Index Spreads, Futures, June
1986, at 46, 46-47.
180. See H. Stoll & R. Whaley, supra note 117, at 24.
181. See generally SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-16.
182. There are basically three types of orders: market, limit and stop. A market order
is an order for immediate execution at the best price available at the time the order
reaches the market; it is the most common type of order. A limit order is an order to
execute a trade only at a specified price (or better). A stop order is a memorandum that
becomes a market order when the price equals or passes the specified memorandum price.
See A. Pessin, supra note 146, at 203-04.
183. NYSE members rent booth space, located around the perimeter of the NYSE's
floor.
184. Floor brokers are members of the securities exchange who execute orders on the
exchange floor.
185. A post is a location on the NYSE floor at which assigned securities are traded.
Several securities may be assigned to trade at a single post.
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execute the trade with either the specialist186 responsible for that stock or
with another broker who was willing to take the other side of the trade.
The procedure for reporting the transaction back to the customer fol-
lowed this pattern but in reverse.
This manual system could not handle the increasing transaction vol-
ume on the NYSE.1 17 The massive paper work 188 required by this sys-
tem overwhelmed NYSE member firms in the late 1960s, resulting in a
"back office" 1 89 crisis. Consequently, the inefficiencies associated with
the manually intensive process, as well as NYSE member firms' demands
for faster executions of their trades, led the NYSE to introduce its Desig-
nated Order Turnaround System in 1976 and an improved version called
SuperDot in 1984, both in turn known popularly as "DOT."' 90
The DOT system, an automated order processing and post trade sys-
tem, links member firms directly to the trading floor of the NYSE. It
permits a broker (through his firm's computer system) to electronically
route an order to the proper trading post on the floor of the NYSE,
where it is executed by the specialist or another floor broker.' 9' The
system then reports the execution of the trade back to the broker over the
same electronic circuit. Moreover, DOT automatically submits the exe-
cuted transaction to the comparison cycle and settlement process.
The computerized DOT system has several advantages over the man-
ual process. Because DOT bypasses member firms' floor booths, it elimi-
nates the commission fees usually paid to their floor brokers on each
trade.192 DOT achieves a faster trade execution because telephone calls
and the walking back and forth from the trading post are unnecessary.
Finally, because executed trades are submitted directly to the comparison
systems, uncompared trades (errors) and manual "back office" process-
186. Trading posts are staffed by specialists, who are exchange members, not employ-
ees of the NYSE. Specialists are assigned securities by the exchange and are expected to
maintain a fair and orderly market in those securities. They perform four distinct func-
tions: agent, dealer, auctioneer and market catalyst. See New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., The Capital Market 18 (1987).
187. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-16.
188. See J. Seligman, The SEC and the Future of Finance 26 (1985).
189. The operations department of a brokerage firm, which processes securities trans-
actions, is known as the back office. See generally D. Weiss, After the Trade is Made
(1986).
190. See Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 12. The introduction of DOT was also a
competitive response by the NYSE to the development of small-order execution systems
by other stock exchanges. These systems include the American Stock Exchange's PER
system, the Midwest Stock Exchange's MAX system, the Pacific Stock Exchange's
SCOREX system, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange's PACE system. See SEC Re-
port, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-24 to 38.
191. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., SuperDot 250 (1988).
192. Nevertheless, the specialist may charge a floor brokerage fee on certain orders.
Unless the order is a sell short market order, the specialists may not charge this fee on
pre-opening market orders up to 5,099 shares, on post-opening market orders up to 2,099
shares, or marketable limit orders up to 2,099 shares executed through DOT. (A market-
able limit order is a limit order that is immediately executable because the price of the
security is equal to or better than the specified limit price of the order.) See id.
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ing costs are essentially eliminated.193
The use of DOT has increased since its introduction in 1976. Initially,
its usefulness was limited because of its slowness and the small order
eligibility size. In 1976, only orders up to 199 shares could be accepted
by DOT while the average size of a trade on the NYSE was 559
shares. 194 But, by September 1987, both the order eligibility size and the
average size of a trade were 2,099 shares. 9 ' The DOT system's execu-
tion speed has also increased. In 1982, "80% of the market orders trans-
mitted through DOT were executed and reported back to the originating
firm within two minutes."1 9 6 This figure rose to 92 percent in 1986 and
to 94 percent by the second quarter of 1987.197 Over two-thirds of the
average daily volume at the NYSE is now routed through the DOT
system. 198
The rapid, inexpensive and reliable order executions available through
the DOT system make it the preferred method for implementing pro-
gram trading strategies in stocks.' 99 Indeed, the NYSE developed the
List Order Processing feature ("LIST"), which allows member firms to
send orders through DOT in a list of securities.2 ° For example, LIST
193. Without DOT, when a trade is executed at a post, the two floor brokers to the
transaction "give-up" the names of the brokerage firms they represent. This information,
the number of shares, and the price at which they agreed is recorded on a floor ticket.
Later that day, the clearing brokerage firms enter this information into data processing
facilities that compare trades between brokerage firms and provide reports indicating un-
compared trades. For example, if broker Z executes a trade with broker F, but inadver-
tently records the trade on the floor ticket as one with broker E, an uncompared trade
report will indicate the absence of a match. However, with DOT, there is no opportunity
for human error; the computer system already matches the trades and then submits them
to the comparison system.
194. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-17 n.52.
195. See id. DOT will accept pre-opening market orders up to 5,099 and post-opening
market orders up to 30,099; however, orders larger than 2,099 are not guaranteed a
timely execution. DOT will accept limit orders up to 99,999 shares. See New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., supra note 191.
196. J. Seligman, supra note 188, at 26.
197. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-19 n.61. The DOT system has an
automatic execution feature. When "the NYSE quote equals the best quote disseminated
by any participant in the Intermarket Trading System and the spread between the bid and
asked is no more than one eighth of one point, . . . the DOT system will automatically
execute the order and immediately report the trade back to the member firm." Id. at 18.
In addition, the NYSE has a reporting feature where a market order transmitted through
DOT receives a reference price when it reaches the DOT system. If the specialist does
not report an "execution of a.. .market order of up to 2,099 shares within three minutes
of its reaching the DOT system," DOT automatically confirms an execution at the refer-
ence price, and, "if the trade has not been made with a third party, the trade is taken by
the specialist's own account." Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study VI, at 11. How-
ever, it is rare that a specialist fails to act within the three minutes. See SEC Report,
supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-18 n.59.
198. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 7-15. In September 1987, on average,
128 million shares per day (or 73 percent of the average daily volume of 175 million
shares) were routed through DOT. See id. ch. 7, at 7-15 n.48.
199. See Norris, The Crash of 1987, Barron's, Oct. 26, 1987, at 8, col. 4.
200. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 1-6; id. ch. 7, at 7-19.
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permits index arbitrageurs to enter buy or sell orders quickly in a large
number of specific securities (up to 500) that they have previously identi-
fied as part of a package. 20 1 Thus, an arbitrageur could have his com-
puter program assemble the exact proportions of stocks to buy or sell
based on his specific strategy and the real-time arbitrage opportunities2 2
existing between his package of stocks and the index contracts in the
futures market.20 3 For instance, if the program detects such an opportu-
nity during the day, the arbitrageur's personal computer would make a
beeping noise, and then with one keystroke, market orders on 250 stocks
totalling $150 million would be transmitted through DOT to the appro-
priate trading posts for rapid execution. Similarly, the LIST feature of
DOT enables managers of index funds to conduct portfolio insurance
and index substitution strategies by moving their whole portfolios effi-
ciently in or out of the stock market.2°4
Program trading strategies can be implemented without the assistance
of DOT, but the process is more costly and cumbersome. Without the
electronic link to the specialists' posts, floor brokers must physically walk
to the trading posts to execute the trades. Moreover, each trade requires
a handwritten, pre-printed floor ticket. Therefore, if an index arbi-
trageur's program indicates that the brokerage firm should sell futures
contracts on the S&P 500 index and buy 200 (in certain proportions) of
the 500 underlying stocks,20 5 200 tickets must be completed. Further-
more, since the 200 stocks are traded at various posts on the floor of the
NYSE, many floor brokers would be needed to execute the trades. The
brokers must be quick because the profitability of the arbitrage depends
on the broker getting an execution at the price or very near the price at
which the computer program was triggered. Because of the number of
floor brokers required to implement program trading strategies without
the use of DOT, only the large brokerage firms with many floor brokers
can continue to profit from its use.20 6
In conclusion, the NYSE's DOT system is one example of a technolog-
ical innovation that has improved the functioning of the markets. Trade
executions are quicker, more accurate and less expensive. This greater
order-handling efficiency benefits both issuers and investors. In the case
of index arbitrageurs, it allows them to profit from the elimination of
pricing inefficiencies between the stock and futures markets, and the fair
pricing which results'is a necessary condition for pension funds to imple-
201. See id. ch. 1, at 6.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 169-76.
203. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 1-6 n.20.
204. See SEC Report, supra note 14, cl. 1, at 1-7.
205. Because not all of the stocks included in the S&P 500 are traded on the NYSE
(some are traded at the AMEX, others are OTC), in this example, it is assumed that the
200 stocks are traded on the NYSE.
206. See Salwen, Big Board Votes to Curb Some Program Trades, Wall St. J., Feb. 5,
1988, at 4, col. 1.
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ment strategies that hedge their equity investments with stock index
futures.
Advancements in securities transaction processing, such as the DOT
system, and the introduction of stock index futures have facilitated pro-
gram trading and brought the stock and futures markets closer together.
This new relationship between the markets has produced a jurisdictional
"turf battle" between financial regulators.
III. REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS: A
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
Until recently, the futures industry and the securities industry oper-
ated as separate markets. Originally, the futures industry traded futures
and options contracts on agricultural commodities, while the securities
industry primarily focused on stocks and bonds. As a result, the federal
regulation of these industries has developed along two distinct paths,
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) responsible
for one and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) responsible
for the other. However, trading strategies employing derivative instru-
ments have linked the futures and securities markets. This new contact
between the two industries has raised questions concerning who should
regulate these new products and what regulatory standards should apply.
Trading in futures contracts is governed by the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA).2 °7 In 1974, Congress extensively amended the act by ex-
panding the scope of the CEA to include non-agricultural commodities
and by creating the CFTC. The CEA now defines the term "commod-
ity"20 8 to include "all other goods and articles... and all services, rights,
and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the
future dealt in," as well as certain specified agricultural products.20 9
The CFTC replaced the Commodity Exchange Authority, an agency
within the United States Department of Agriculture, as the principal reg-
ulator of the futures industry. The role of the CFTC is broader than its
predecessor since Congress expanded the definition of a commodity.
Congress also gave the agency exclusive jurisdiction over all transactions
in futures contracts and commodity options21° to facilitate the develop-
ment and implementation of a cohesive regulatory structure in the fu-
207. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
208. Congress expanded the definition because by 1974 a number of futures contracts
traded in the United States were unregulated because they fell outside the narrow scope
of the CEA. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5843, 5858-59. For example, these unregulated futures con-
tracts included contracts on coffee, lumber and foreign currencies. See id. Moreover,
Congress realized that futures trading would expand to a variety of other instruments and
believed that such new products should be regulated. See id.; H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42, 62 (1974).
209. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
210. See Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (1974).
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tures industry "and to prevent the costs and confusion associated with
multiple regulators." '
Jurisdictional conflicts between the SEC and CFTC arose shortly after
the CFTC's creation. In 1975, the CFTC approved the trading of futures
contracts on Government National Mortgage Association mortgage-
backed pass-through certificates (GNMAs) and U.S. Treasury bills.2 12
These contracts were clearly commodities for purposes of the CEA under
CFTC jurisdiction, but the instruments underlying them were obviously
securities under the securities laws, thereby coming within SEC jurisidic-
tion. In a 1975 letter to the CFTC, the chairman of the SEC set forth the
SEC's concerns about overlapping regulation and urged the CFTC to
refrain from authorizing additional futures-securities contracts.21 3 The
CFTC replied that Congress had given it exclusive jurisdiction over com-
modity futures contracts on securities, even though the underlying secur-
ity might be within the purview of the SEC.214 This controversy between
the agencies continued as new derivative financial products were
developed.21 5
The CFTC and the SEC did not resolve their jurisdictional dispute
until 1981.216 At that time, the chairmen of the agencies negotiated the
so-called Johnson-Shad Accord, which Congress subsequently enacted
through amendments to the federal securities laws and the CEA.217 This
legislation grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over all futures con-
tracts and options on futures contracts.21 8 Additionally, while trading in
futures (or options on futures) on individual corporate or municipal se-
curities is prohibited, the CFTC has jurisdiction over futures on stock
indices and municipal bond indices, and over futures on individual gov-
ernment securities (and over options on such futures contracts).219 On
the other hand, the SEC retains jurisdiction to regulate options on securi-
211. 1 T. Russo, supra note 47, § 10.03, at 10-7.
212. See Seeger, The Development of Congressional Concern About Financial Futures
Markets, in Futures Markets: Regulatory Issues 5-6 (A. Peck ed. 1985).
213. See Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securi-
ties and Commodities Laws, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1599, 1637 (1986).
214. See Seeger, supra note 212, at 8.
215. Following the SEC's approval of a proposal by the Chicago Board of Options
Exchange ("CBOE") to trade options on GNMAs, the Chicago Board of Trade
("CBOT") sued the SEC, contending that options on GNMAs fell within the CFTC's
exclusive jurisdiction and that the SEC therefore lacked authority to approve CBOE's
proposal. The CFTC filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the CBOT. See Chicago
Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
216. See J. Markham, The History of Commodities Futures Trading and Its Regula-
tion 108-09 (1987); Rosen, The Impact of the Futures Trading Act of 1982 Upon Com-
modity Regulation, 3 J. Futures Markets 235, 242 (1983).
217. The amendments to the securities laws were adopted in the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982), and the Amendments to
the commodities laws were adopted in the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
218. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982).
219. See id,
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ties, including groups of securities or indices based on the value of the
securities (which includes exempt securities and exempt securities
indices).22
Index futures and options received special attention in the resolution
of the jurisidictional dispute. Once an index futures contract or option
on such contract (whether based on equity or debt securities) has been
approved by the CFTC, the CFTC exercises exclusive jurisdiction to reg-
ulate its trading.221 Prior to approving such a contract, however, the
CFTC must determine that it meets all of the following minimum re-
quirements.222 First, the settlement or delivery must be in cash or by
means other than the transfer or receipt of a security.223 Second, trading
in such contracts must not be readily susceptible to manipulation,224 or
use in the manipulation, of the price of the security.2 25 Finally, "[s]uch
group or index of securities shall be predominantly composed of the se-
curities of unaffiliated issuers and shall be a widely published measure of,
and shall reflect, the market for all publicly traded equity or debt securi-
ties or a substantial segment thereof, or shall be comparable to such mea-
sure." 22 6 Moreover, the CEA provides that even if the CFTC finds an
index futures or options contract acceptable, the SEC can veto the
CFTC's approval if it believes that the contract does not meet the statu-
tory requirements.227
In addition to the jurisdictional disagreement between the SEC and the
CFTC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Fed")
and the CFTC have argued over who has the authority to prescribe mar-
gin requirements for stock index futures. Margin authority over futures
is vested in the private sector-the futures exchanges and their clearing
houses. Generally, the CFTC has no authority to review the margin
rules established by the individual futures exchanges.228 However, if the
CFTC has reason to believe an "emergency" exists, it has the authority
220. See id.; Connolly, A Review of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, 6 Corp. L. Rev.
342, 345 (1983). In addition, the SEC has jurisdiction over options on foreign currencies
traded on a national securities exchange, but the CFTC has exclusive authority in all
other instances. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Moreover, the CFTC regulates futures con-
tracts on foreign currencies. See id.
221. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982).
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. In analyzing a stock index future contract's susceptibility to manipulation, the
regulators focus on the number of stocks composing the index, the capitalization, the
depth and liquidity of the secondary market for the component stocks, the degree to
which the prices of component stocks move together, and the system of calculating the
index value. See Edwards & Edwards, A Legal and Economic Analysis of Manipulation in
Futures Markets, 4 J. Futures Markets 333, 360-61 (1984).
225. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982).
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12) (1982). However, the CFTC has authority to establish mar-
gin levels for options. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b), (c) (1982).
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to establish temporary margin levels for any futures contract.22 9 An
emergency is defined to include not only "threatened or actual market
manipulations and corners, [but also] any act of the United States or a
foreign government affecting a commodity or any other major market
disturbance which prevents the market from accurately reflecting the
forces of supply and demand for such commodity. '230
The Fed claims margin-setting authority over stock index futures and
options and other derivative instruments because such authority is neces-
sary to limit the use of credit for speculative purposes and to assure com-
petitive equality among functionally equivalent instruments.23' To date,
however, the Fed has neither exercised its presumed authority, nor de-
cided whether it should have joint authority with the CFTC and the SEC
over margins on derivative instruments.232 This current, bifurcated
framework, where stocks are regulated by the SEC and stock index fu-
tures are regulated by the CFTC, came under critical examination after it
failed to prevent the crash of 1987.
IV. THE ROLE OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
IN THE CRASH OF 1987
Following five years of unprecedented growth, the stock market began
to decline in August 1987 after the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA) peaked at 2722.233 The fall accelerated during the week of Octo-
ber 12th and the market eventually crashed on "Black" Monday, Octo-
ber 19th, when the DJIA dropped 508 points to 1738: the bull market
had ended.234 In retrospect, the dramatic increase in stock values and
their eventual collapse on Black Monday can be attributed to a variety of
economic and psychological factors, as well as to the use of program
trading strategies based on derivative instruments.235 Thus, the run-up
in stock prices between 1982 and 1987 set the stage for an eventual
correction.236
229. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1982).
230. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1982).
231. See Edwards, Futures Markets in Transition: The Uneasy Balance Between Gov-
ernment and Self-Regulation, 3 J. Futures Markets 191, 195-97 (1983); Kane, Regulatory
Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition Between the SEC, the CFTC,
and Other Agencies, 4 J. Futures Markets 367, 380-83 (1984).
The Fed's rationale is that since stock index futures contracts are functionally
equivalent to options on stock indexes (on which the Fed has margin-setting authority
because such options are defined as securities), it has authority to impose margin require-
ments on stock index futures as well. More specifically, if similar margins levels were not
imposed, "there would be both unequal regulation of market participants in similar prod-
ucts and a potential for erosion in the board's margin requirements for securities credit."
Seeger, supra note 212, at 21.
232. See Review of Margins, supra note 64 at 25-26.
233. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study III, at 111-1.
234. See id.
235. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 36.
236. See Ricks, 'Incredibly' High Prices Caused Market Plunge, Panel's Chief Says,
Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 14, col. 5.
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Several economic conditions contributed to the bull market in which
the DJIA rose from 777 to 2722 between August 1982 and August
1987.237 Low interest rates and rising employment characterized the pe-
riod following the 1981-1982 recession.238 This favorable economic cli-
mate pushed stock prices upward. From 1984 through 1987 the growth
in the nation's money supply, which the Fed permitted to occur, created
the liquidity that allowed the stock market to be bid up further.23 9 De-
spite increasing stock prices, stocks remained relatively inexpensive and
offered higher returns than other capital assets because of the low level of
inflation in the economy. 24 Consequently, instead of being net issuers of
securities, corporations became purchasers through mergers and acquisi-
tions.2 4' Moreover, in response to the "merger mania" of this period,
corporations announced recapitalizations and stock repurchases as de-
fensive measures.2 42 Thus, takeover activity (and the rumor of takeover
activity) fueled higher stock prices.24 3
The United States was not the only country experiencing economic
growth: both the United Kingdom and Japan participated in the "global
bull market."12 " Moreover, because of the ability to shift capital around
the world, transnational financial activity increased. In the first half of
1987, foreign institutions bought as many shares of United States equities
as did domestic institutions. 4 5 In summary, an improvement in eco-
nomic conditions, the availability of cash, takeover activity, and the sup-
ply of foreign money fostered a demand for stocks that spurred the bull
market on between August 1982 to August 1987.
Investor psychology also played an important role in the rise of stock
237. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 9.
238. See Stewart & Hertzberg, Speculative Fever Ran High in the 10 Months Prior to
Black Monday, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
239. See id.
[T]he money supply grew 12% in 1985 and 15% in 1986, unprecedented back-
to-back increases. In late 1986, the Fed opened the credit spigot to accommo-
date a huge wave of sales of businesses and financial assets as investors rushed
to beat the Dec. 31 revision in capital-gains tax rates. The money supply soared
about $18 billion in December 1986 alone ....
Id.
240. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at 1-2. The perception that stocks
were cheap was strengthened by takeover specialists, who valued stocks based on their
liquidation value (i.e., the value of a company if it is broken up and its assets are sold off),
which was higher than traditional valuation methods based on future earnings potential
of a continuing business. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 38; Stewart & Hertzberg,
supra note 238, at 1, col. 6; cf. J. Brooks, The Takeover Game 253-55 (1987) (the take-
over activity of the 1980s has been driven by investment bankers who "sell" M&A deals
to corporate executives and thereby earn high fees).
241. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at 1-2.
242. See id. at 1-3.
243. See Stewart & Hertzberg, supra note 238, at 1, col. 6.
244. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at I-I, I-5 to 11.
245. See id. at 1. Similarly, domestic institutional investors became increasingly active
in the foreign markets. See id.; Burrough, Forman, & Graven, How Merrill Lynch Moves
Its Stock Deals All Around the World, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
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prices. As the bull market advanced, many financial analysts and publi-
cations indicated that stock prices, although at historically high levels,
were justified in light of the favorable economic climate.246 In retrospect,
these estimates were not based on a rational, traditional valuation.2 47 At
the time, however, investors believed that the market would continue to
rise even if it were overvalued. 48 Hence, the mass psychology of a large
number of investors, who would gladly pay three times what a stock was
worth with the expectation of selling it for six times its worth, helped fuel
the bull market.24 9
Even sophisticated institutional investors succumbed to the psychol-
ogy of the bull market, but many expected to hedge against a market
decline by availing themselves of portfolio insurance.25 0 For several
months preceding the crash there was a general concern that the market
was overvalued in light of the downturn in various economic conditions
such as rising interest rates, persistent trade and budget deficits and the
declining value of the dollar.251 Ordinarily, such conditions would
prompt the sale of stocks. Nevertheless, many pension fund managers,
specifically those employing a portfolio insurance strategy, hesitated to
sell until prices fell.252 They reasoned that they could get out of the mar-
ket quickly, and thus cushion the impact of a drop, by selling stock index
futures.2 53 Consequently, believing that their portfolios were "insured,"
institutional investors continued to buy and/or hold equities.254 There-
fore, all other things being equal, stock prices were higher than they
would have been if investors had not relied on dynamic hedging utilizing
stock index futures.2 55
Just as no single factor can explain the incredibly high stock prices of
the bull market, no single factor, economic, psychological, or structural
alone accounts for the size and breadth of the crash of 1987.256 First,
"the two-week decline that immediately preceded the October 19 market
break . . was triggered by changes in investor perceptions regarding
246. See Stewart & Hertzberg, supra note 238, at 1, col. 6.
247. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at 1-3. Stock prices were over-
valued relative to bond yields and asset values. See id.
248. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 38. After all, based on past experience, the
market had continued upward for nearly five years.
249. See B. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 24 (4th ed. 1985); Stewart &
Hertzberg, supra note 238, at 1, col. 6.
250. See Melloan, Fund Managers Were Edgy Long Before Crash, Wall St. J., Nov. 10,
1987, at 37, col. 3.
251. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 39-40; Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study
I, at I-i1 to -14; SEC Report, supra note 14, chap. 3, at 3-9 to 10; cf Melloan, supra note
250, at 37, col. 3.
252. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 9.
253. See id.
254. Just a couple of weeks before the crash, it is estimated that $68 billion of assets
were hedged using portfolio insurance. See Ring, Management Approaches: What
Worked What Didn't, Pensions & Investment Age, Nov. 2, 1987, at 50.
255. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 9.
256. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-9.
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investment fundamentals and economic conditions." '257 Second, on Oc-
tober 19, "institutional stock selling was the largest single direct factor
responsible for the initial opening declines" in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average and the S&P 500 Index. 58 Finally, "panic selling in a broad
range of stocks caused by a variety of factors coupled with [a complete]
absence of buyers (except at distressed levels) was primarily responsible
for the free-fall decline that characterized the final hour of trading in
stocks" at the NYSE on October 19th.z59
In the weeks before October 19th, investors' sentiments grew bearish
in the face of increasingly negative economic news and uncertainty as to
the sustainability of high stock prices. 2" As interest rates rose,2 61 fears
of inflation returned.262 Consequently, non-equity investments offering
higher yields became more appealing.2 63 Although the budget deficit had
persisted for several years, concern grew that foreign investors, who held
a disproportionately large share of U.S. government debt securities,
would not finance the deficit forever. 2 " Moreover, the United States
government appeared to be making little progress at reducing it.2 65 The
value of the dollar fell as the United States trade deficit persisted.266 As a
result, "[t]he only way to induce foreigners to continue to invest in
[United States government] debt securities denominated in a deteriorat-
ing currency was to offer them a higher interest rate., 2 67 Consequently,
the "imminent" arrival of higher rates brought a fear of recession, in-
duced by a tightening of credit by the Fed.268 Hence, an impending re-
cession meant stocks were overvalued.
Another factor contributing to the crash of 1987 may have been legis-
lation that threatened the continuation of corporate takeover activity.269
On October 13, 1987, the House Ways and Means Committee proposed
to limit tax deductions for certain interest expenses incurred in leveraged
acquisitions.270 Consequently, the prospect of more takeovers, leading to
257. Id.
258. See id. at 11.
259. See id.
260. See Smith, Swartz & Anders, What Really Ignited the Market's Collapse After Its
Long Climb, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
261. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at 1-12.
262. See id. at 1-13.
263. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 39. On October 14, 1987, the yield on thirty-
year Treasury bonds was over 10 percent. In contrast, stocks were only yielding 3 per-
cent. See Smith, Swartz & Anders, supra note 260, at 1, col. 6.
264. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at 1-12.
265. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 39. At the same time, worldwide instability in
the currency markets added to the market anxiety. See Task Force Report, supra note
11, Study I, at 1-12.
266. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study I, at 1-12.
267. Id. at 1-14.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 1-13.
270. See id.
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higher stock prices, diminished severely."' 1
Because of this growing bearish sentiment, institutional and individual
investors from the United States and abroad began to sell their stock
portfolios heavily during the week before Black Monday.2 72 While pro-
gram trading was not solely responsible for the crash, program trading
strategies may have exacerbated the price decline.2 73 As portfolio man-
agers saw the market drop, they attempted to put more "insurance" into
place by selling stock index futures.2 74 The magnitude of these transac-
tions drove down the price of futures below fair value. 75 Index arbi-
trageurs, recognizing the discount between the futures market and the
stock market, bought futures contracts and sold the underlying stocks-
sending stock prices down further.2 76 Thus, as a result of direct selling
and derivative instrument-related strategies, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average declined 235.48 points between October 14 and 16, including a
drop of 108 points on October 16.277
With a weekend to ponder these developments and a newspaper report
on Sunday that the Treasury Department might allow the dollar to drop
even further, 7 8 investors decided to sell from the opening on Black Mon-
day. 79 The institutional investors rocked the market. For example, Fi-
delity Investments, a large mutual fund group that keeps many of its
stock funds fully invested in the market, faced redemption requests from
its customers. Consequently, Fidelity sold approximately $800 million
worth of stocks on October 19th.2180 General Motors' pension fund was
also one of the biggest sellers on that day. It sold at least $1.1 billion in
stock.281
Amid the uncertainty and price declines, portfolio insurers sold stock
index futures to hedge stock values. For example, Wells Fargo Invest-
ment Advisers, a major portfolio insurer, sold $1.56 billion in futures on
271. See Smith, Swartz, & Anders, supra note 260, at 1, col. 6.
272. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 29-30.
273. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-11.
274. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study III, at 111-7; id. at 29-30.
275. See id. at 111-7. In reaction to large declines in stock prices, several institutional
investors using a portfolio insurance strategy sold stock index futures to hedge their port-
folios instead of selling their stocks outright. Consequently, their heavy selling of stock
index futures contracts, unaccompanied by a strong demand, pushed futures prices lower
to sometimes substantial discounts. For example, on October 15, 1987, reactive selling of
stock index futures by portfolio insurers led to an initial price spread between the S&P
500 futures contract and the S&P 500 spot value of negative 1.50 points (i.e., a discount).
In contrast, the futures contracts should have traded at its fair value, which was a posi-
tive 1.75 points (i.e., a premium) above the S&P 500 spot value. See id.
276. See id. at 30.
277. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 2, at 2-6.
278. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study III, at 111-16.
279. See id. at 30; SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 2, at 2-12.
280. See Smith, GM's Pension Fund, Among Biggest Sellers, Sold at Least $L1 Billion
of Stock on Oct. 19, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1988, at 45, col. 5.
281. See id.
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October 19th.2 82 These sales were partially absorbed by speculators in
the futures market, but purchases by index arbitrageurs also transmitted
the selling pressure to the stock market. As a result, additional stock
price declines precipitated further sales by portfolio insurers. This spiral-
ling effect is known as the "cascade scenario. ' '28 3
After mid-day on October 19th, the linkage between the futures mar-
ket and the stock market was practically disconnected by information
delays and execution problems at the NYSE. Because so much institu-
tional investor trading was done through NYSE's SuperDot, the system
strained and resulted in one hour delays for order execution. 28 4 More-
over, the increased volume of trading caused computer malfunctions and
printer delays. This overload resulted in the consolidated tape reporting
stale prices.28 5 Faced with execution and price uncertainty, index arbi-
trageurs, who would have purchased stock index futures that had been
driven to a discount by portfolio insurance selling pressure, stayed out of
the market.286 Consequently, the discount between futures and underly-
ing stocks persisted and widened. Since a portfolio insurance strategy
becomes more expensive as the discount gets deeper,28 7 some managers
stopped selling stock index futures and began unloading their equity po-
sitions directly on the stock market. 2 8 Thus, portfolio insurance,
designed to hedge against losses in stock values, failed to provide ade-
quate coverage when stock prices fell precipitously.2 9
Institutional investors' awareness of active portfolio insurance strate-
gies created an "overhang" effect in both the futures and stock mar-
kets.290 Some institutions anticipated portfolio insurance related selling
of futures and the arbitrage linked selling of stocks.29 1 Accordingly, in-
stitutional investors not employing portfolio insurance attempted to sell
their stocks before the programs hit the markets.292 Moreover, other in-
stitutional traders refrained from entering the market as buyers because
282. See id.
283. Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Role
of Index-Related Trading in the Market Decline on September 11 and 12, 1986, 21-22
(1987). However, after approximately 1:30 p.m. on Black Monday, the cascade effect
became less of a factor in the price fall. See CFTC Final Report, supra note 6, at 23.
284. See Smith, Swartz & Anders, supra note 260, at 20, col. 4. Under normal condi-
tions, market orders processed through DOT are executed within two minutes. See supra
note 196 and accompanying text.
285. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 73-75.
286. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 34-36; Hansell, The Wrong Villain?,
Institutional Investor, Jan. 1988, at 47; Smith, Swartz & Anders, supra note 260, at 1, col.
6.
287. See supra text accompanying note 168.
288. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 2, at 2-15.
289. See Rubenstein, Portfolio Insurance and the Market Crash, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-
Feb. 1988, at 38-41; Anders, Portfolio Insurance Proved Cold Comfort, Wall St. J., Oct.
28, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
290. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-12.
291. See id. at 12; Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 29.
292. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 29.
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of the anticipated heavy selling pressure, which was "billboarded" by the
persistent discount between stock index futures contracts and the under-
lying stock index.293
Program trading affected the depth and speed of the decline. Index
arbitrage selling amounted to 37.6 million shares of stock.2 94 This repre-
sented 6.2 percent of the NYSE volume on October 19.295 Moreover, for
a while that day index arbitrage selling accounted for more than 45 per-
cent of S&P 500 stock volume.2 9 6 Additionally, the availability, for part
of the day, of nearly instantaneous price information and SuperDot to
rapidly execute transactions made the collapse in stock prices more con-
centrated than it would otherwise have been. However, because program
trading related selling only accounts for a small percentage of total vol-
ume, other factors must be responsible for the free-fall decline in prices
that occurred during the last few hours of trading on October 19th.
Panic may also have contributed to the drop in stock prices. Stocks
plummeted because of a "self-feeding cycle of investor fear that [the] day
of economic reckoning [was] at hand. '29 7 The institutions wanted to sell,
so price declines fed on previous price declines.2 98
In summary, the existence of derivative instruments and the use of
related program trading strategies may have been a means for rapidly
reducing prices, but they clearly were not the underlying cause of the
break. Economic and psychological factors that aided the bull market's
climb also contributed to its collapse.
V. POLICY ISSUES
Changes in the financial markets, whether initiated by market forces or
regulation, have important economic consequences. Accordingly, deci-
sions concerning the structure and regulation of financial markets must
be made in the context of their economic impact.2 99 Preserving the eco-
nomic functions of financial markets should be a primary objective of
financial policy making."° Only with these primary functions in mind
can financial policy makers evaluate whether changes are needed in the
securities and futures markets.
293. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 3-12.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. Shiller, Crash Course, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1988, at Bi, col. 1.
298. "[G]iven the volume of funds in the hands of institutional investors, simultaneous
decisions to sell will find no one on the buy side with comparable financial muscle."
Katzenbach Study, supra note 4, at 21.
299. See Staff of the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., Restruc-
turing Financial Markets: The Major Policy Issues 254 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter
Restructuring Financial Markets].
300. See id.
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The securities markets exist to facilitate capital formation."' In the
primary (or new issue) securities market, businesses that need capital for
the creation of productive facilities sell securities to persons willing to
lend them money, or participate in ownership, for the opportunity to
earn a return on their investments.302 Crucial to the willingness of inves-
tors to purchase securities in the primary market is their ability to sell
them at some point in the future. 3  A secondary (or trading) market
such as the New York Stock Exchange provides a place for buying and
selling securities in an organized manner.3 4 It furnishes a mechanism
for the pricing of securities and supplies the liquidity necessary for capi-
tal formation. 05 Accordingly, in theory the stock market encourages the
efficient allocation of capital resources to those firms who will use it in
the most productive fashion.
The economic purpose of the financial futures markets is to facilitate
the mutually desired transfer of risk. 30 6 Derivative instruments such as
stock index futures contracts allow investors to hedge against possible
stock market losses. The price risk of ownership or potential ownership
of stocks can be shifted to those who are willing to carry this risk in
return for a potential profit. Because risk adjustments can be accom-
plished in the futures market at a lower transactions cost than in the
securities market, the use of stock index futures promotes "a more effi-
cient and preferred distribution of risk bearing in society. ' 30 7
Following Black Monday, several studies commissioned by the gov-
ernment and the exchanges investigated the causes of the stock market
crash and recommended ways to avoid a similar occurrence. Many of
these suggestions, if implemented, will have an important impact on the
current structure and regulation of the financial markets. Additionally,
because of the significant role of these markets in the economy, such
changes have potentially large implications that extend far beyond the
financial markets themselves.3 08
Many recommendations of the various studies appear to address the
same issue: After Black Monday, how can investors' confidence30 9 in the
301. See L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 591 (2d ed. 1988).
302. See id. at 591-92.
303. See id. While investors may be willing to buy shares of a company's stock, they
usually are unwilling to commit their funds to that company indefinitely.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See Interagency Study, supra note 35, ch. I, at 8.
307. See id. ch. II, at 22.
308. See generally Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study VII, at VII-1 to VII-4
(describes interrelationship between significant stock price decline and economic activity
and fiscal policy).
309. The state of investors' confidence and the volatility of stock prices are related.
While investors may expect large changes in stock prices, it is the uncertainty of the
precise form of these changes that weakens confidence. See J. Keynes, The General The-
ory of Employment, Interest, and Money 148 (1936 & photo. reprint 1964). The greater
the uncertainty, the greater the investment risk (i.e., the possibility that expectations will
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stock market be restored? In particular, the focus is: What should be
done to curb the "excessive" stock price volatility associated with deriva-
tive instruments and related program trading strategies?31° The difficulty
with many of these remedies is that they are "quick fixes," aimed at
treating symptoms rather than appropriately addressing the long-run
structural problems of the markets.311 Policymakers should make a care-
ful diagnosis before prescribing market regulations because inappropriate
medication can have unwanted side-effects and not cure the illness.31 2
A. Proposed Prescriptions for Treating the Symptoms
1. The Fed as Intermarket Regulator
From an economic perspective, the markets for stocks, stock options,
and stock index futures are in fact one market though they have been
traditionally considered as separate financial markets.3 13 These markets
not be realized). Consequently, assuming investors are risk averse, all other things being
equal, "unpredictably" large price movements may discourage investment in stocks and
thus capital formation.
310. It seems as though "volatility" of stock prices only became an important issue to
investors when prices dropped and not when the market was climbing: "volatility" has
apparently become a buzzword for "down." See Bleiberg, Don't Ban Program Trading,
Barron's, May 16, 1988, at 9; Cowan, Market Volatility: Who is the Culprit?, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1987, at D12, col. 1. For example, in its interim report, The Working
Group on Financial Markets recommends coordinated trading halts across equity and
equity related markets only when there is a 250 point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. See Working Group Report, supra note 16, at 4.
The Division of Market Regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission adopts
the fundamental assumption that extreme price volatility, such as occurred during the
market break, is undesirable. See SEC Report, supra note 14, at xii. Because greater,
unpredictable volatility (and therefore uncertainty) can reduce investors' confidence in
holding stocks, U.S. corporations may find it difficult to raise capital efficiently through
the sale of equity securities. See id. Considerable debate exists over whether the intro-
duction of stock index futures and their use in program trading strategies have increased
the volatility of stock prices. Despite a perception that they do, empirical research indi-
cates that derivative instruments and program trading have not increased day-to-day
market volatility. See C. Davis & A. White, Stock Market Volatility 1 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve System Staff Study No. 153, 1987); Task Force Report, supra note 11,
Study II, at 5 ("it is difficult to argue that the recent increases in volatility represent
anything more significant than normal cyclical fluctuations"). But see SEC Report, supra
note 14, ch. 3, at 3-8 & n.32 (spring of 1982 event date does not accurately capture the
full effect of futures trading). However, it is uncertain whether intra-day volatility has
increased because of program trading. C. Davis & A. White, supra, at 1.
311. See Szymezak, Who Will Regulate Index Trading, Futures, Mar. 1988, at 42;
Hansell, The Wrong Villain?, Institutional Investor, Jan. 1988, at 48; Reich, After the
Fall, Institutional Investor, Jan. 1988, at 33, 35.
312. See J. Grundfest, Regulating the International Capital Markets: A New World
and A New Perspective 5 (Nov. 11, 1987) (advance text of the City Association lecture,
given by the Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Chartered
Association of Certified Public Accountants) (available in the files of the Fordham Law
Review).
313. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 59. Stock index options and options on
stock indices are also part of the single market. But see M. Mayer, Markets 231 (1988)
(The markets are quite separate; it is computerized trading that allows participants to
behave as though the markets are one).
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are driven by the same economic forces. Many of the same institutions
dominate trading in all three markets, and these markets are linked
through computer-assisted trading strategies involving similar financial
instruments.314 Consequently, the purpose, structure, and performance
of each market influences the others.
In response to this economic reality, one study recommends that a sin-
gle federal agency should have full intermarket oversight authority.31 5
The current regulatory structure-with the Securities and Exchange
Commission responsible for stocks and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission responsible for stock index futures-may destabilize the
stock market and thus undermine public confidence. Each agency has its
own style, with the SEC taking a more interventionist and conservative
regulatory approach than the CFTC.316 No overall integrated cross-
market authority exists. When each agency regulates its respective mar-
ket independently of each other, different and conflicting signals can be
sent to market users.317 Thus, one federal agency with authority over
both markets may be more efficient for coordinating operating rules and
procedures in the separate markets and for making timely decisions
based on information from all markets. A single agency could coordi-
nate intermarket issues such as clearing and credit mechanisms, margin
requirements, "circuit breaker" mechanisms (such as price limits and
trading halts) and information systems.31 8 Moreover, one agency with
consolidated regulatory authority and responsibility is likely to engender
public confidence in a time of financial crisis.
Some have suggested that the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System should have intermarket regulatory authority. 319 The Fed
is a logical choice because its span of control exceeds that of the other
financial regulators. 320 The SEC and CFTC have comparatively narrow
policy missions when contrasted with the Fed's responsibility for
macroeconomic, financial stability.321 Specifically, the integrity of the se-
curities and futures markets is also related to money flows in the econ-
omy. Hence, there is an additional advantage of giving the Fed, as the
central bank, overall intermarket authority.
322
314. See Brady, One Marketplace, Indivisible, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1988, at A23, col.
2.
315. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 59-60.
316. See Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition
Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. Futures Markets 367, 374 (1984).
317. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study VI, at VI-78. In part, the split
regulatory scheme accounts for differences in margin requirements, clearing and settle-
ment procedures, and other trading rules. See id. at VI-78 to VI-80.
318. See id. at 63-67.
319. See id. at 69; cf H.R. 4997, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1988) (The proposed
Securities Market Reform Act of 1988 gives exclusive jurisdiction over securities deriva-
tive instruments to the SEC and gives margin setting authority to the Fed.).
320. See Kane, supra note 316, at 377.
321. See id.
322. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 62. For example, because of the poten-
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Several disadvantages to this proposal are apparent. At present the
Fed lacks the regulatory expertise that the CFTC and SEC have devel-
oped over the years in their respective markets.323 This temporary prob-
lem could be overcome in time, but it would require a period of
adjustment. If the Fed assumes a dominant role, many market partici-
pants (such as securities firms and clearing houses) might take additional
risks, presuming that the Fed will bail them out of financial difficulty.324
Therefore, although the Fed is strategically positioned in the current reg-
ulatory framework to assume the responsibility of intermarket regulator,
such a choice may have the unfavorable impact of institutionalizing the
perception that it is also the lender of last resort to the securities indus-
try.325 Hence, while potentially instilling investor confidence in the near
term, the rush to create an intermarket regulator could have undesirable,
long-run effects on the economy.326
2. Raising Margin Requirements in the Futures Market
Another group recommends raising margin deposit requirements on
stock index futures to match the margins on the stocks themselves.327
tial losses that clearinghouse members, investment banks, and specialist firms might have
suffered as a result of the crash, a number of the major commercial banks withdrew
uncommitted lines of credit to these market participants. This response, combined with
rumors of defaults, raised questions about the viability of the financial system. On the
morning of October 20, 1987, the Fed took an important step to assure the availability of
credit by announcing that it would act as a source of liquidity for the commercial banks.
See Task Force Report, supra, note 11, at 52. Chicago banks proceeded to lend to their
customers, but several New York banks hesitated even with the Fed's promise. See M.
Mayer, Markets 75-80 (1988).
323. See Testimony Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
22 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governers of the Fed. Reserve Sys-
tem) (Feb. 2, 1988) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Green-
span Testimony]; M. Mayer, supra note 322, at 62-63.
324. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 323, at 22-23 ("there could be a presump-
tion by many that the federal safety net applicable to depository institutions was being
extended to these markets").
325. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 62-63. But see Hatfield, Stock Market
Crash Lessons, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1988, at 15, col. 2. "Investment banks have grown so
large ... that the Federal Reserve cannot allow them to fail." Id. "[Tlhe Fed must
recognize the declining distinction between commercial and investment banks by provid-
ing investment banks limited access to the discount window and becoming the lender of
last resort to the major investment banks." Id.
326. One author suggests that there is no convincing rationale for a single agency regu-
lator of the financial markets, and he suggests that the motivating force for such a propo-
sal is that various entities such as the NYSE and the SEC are "attempting to use the
October crash to justify anti-competitive proposals that have as their aim not the preven-
tion of future crises, but rather the enactment of proposals to gain advantage over com-
petitors" such as the CME and the CFTC. See Fischel, Should One Agency Regulate
Financial Markets, in Black Monday and the Future of Financial Markets 119 (R.
Kamphuis, Jr., R. Kormendi & J. Watson eds. 1989).
327. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 65; SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3, at
3-22. For a discussion of the degree of consistency across markets that is desirable and
attainable, see generally Estrella, Consistent Margin Requirements: Are They Feasible?,
Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y. Q. Rev., Summer 1988, at 61. "Making margins consistent
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Free of federal regulation, futures exchanges have established their mar-
gin levels to achieve one objective: to protect clearing houses and bro-
kers and thus assure the integrity of the marketplace.32 8 On the other
hand, initial margin ratios in the stock market are in place to prevent
excessive volatility in share prices, and the "protection of market integ-
rity is seen as a beneficial by-product of these other objectives. 329
Excessive price fluctuations can occur because of increased speculative
trading.33° If leveraged trading in stocks has the potential for accentuat-
ing movements of stock prices above or below the fundamental values,
then leveraged trading in stock index futures would seem to have this
same potential because taking a margined position in stock index futures
is a close substitute for assuming a margined position in securities.331
Index arbitrage trading between the two markets makes this so. In sum-
mary, since stocks and derivative instruments compose one market, in an
economic sense, there should be a "level playing field" across markets.
Accordingly, margins for futures based on stock indexes should be equal-
ized with margins on stock.
While it is theoretically consistent to raise futures margins to bring
them in line with margin requirements for stock, this proposal is not
necessarily a proper solution to the questions of reducing volatility. Im-
plicit in the argument that margins on stock index futures are too low is
the presumption that the margin level for stocks is "correct." The mini-
mum margin requirements on stock, which the Fed established to curb
the excessive speculation that lead up to the crash of 1929,332 may actu-
ally have little impact on the behavior of stock prices.333 Thus, despite
across markets demands some serious thought about why there are margin requirements
at all." Id. at 69. Even if the regulators want to make margins consistent, consistency
can be difficult to define or evaluate. See id. at 69-70. Furthermore, massive changes to
the operations of stock, futures, and option markets would be necessary. See id. at 70.
328. See Review of Margins, supra note 64, at 16.
329. Id. The staff of the Federal Reserve cited two other objectives of margin require-
ments: (1) to prevent the securities markets from unduly diverting credit away from
"productive" uses such as loans extended in connection with investments in new plants
and equipment, see id. at 9, and (2) to protect unsophisticated investors from assuming
risks associated with owning securities (i.e., high margin requirements will discourage an
investor of limited means from buying stocks). See id. at 11. However, the staff generally
concluded that the historical concerns over diversion of credit were false or marginal, see
id. at 9-11, and that investor protection could be better achieved through means other
than prescribing margin levels. See id. at 12. See also Figlewski, Margins and Market
Integrity. Margin Setting for Stock Index Futures and Options, 4 J. of Futures Markets
385, 389-91 (1984) (reducing excessive price fluctuations has come to be the most widely
cited purpose of federal margin regulation).
330. Both the stock market crash of 1929 and the crash of 1987 illustrate markets
driven to "speculative excess."
331. See Review of Margins, supra note 64, at 17-18.
332. See id. at 45-50.
333. See id. at 165-67. Although not conclusive, there appears to be a "lack of any
positive demonstration that margin regulation has served to dampen stock price fluctua-
tions." Id. at 163. But see Hardouvelis, Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatil-
ity, Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y. Q. Rev., Summer 1988, at 80. A study by the Federal
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
its historical justification, margin regulation of the stock (or futures)
markets may no longer be the appropriate method for curbing short-term
speculative trading and resulting price volatility. Accordingly, it may be
that margins on stock should be lowered rather than futures margins
raised.
Even if minimum margin requirements are maintained for the purpose
of ensuring market integrity334 instead of the original objective of damp-
ening price volatility,335 "consistent" margins for stock and stock index
futures do not imply "equal" margins.336 There are principally two fac-
tors relevant in setting margin requirements that will provide an assur-
ance against default: first, the level of default risk exposure that is
acceptable; and second, the amount of time expected to lapse between the
request for payment and the actual payment by the investor.3 37 Accord-
ingly, it follows that "[t]he lower the level of exposure (i.e., the higher the
desired level of protection against price changes), the higher the level of
margins," and "[tihe longer the grace period, the higher the necessary
margin level for a given level of exposure., 3  Therefore, since broad
stock indices such as the S&P 500 index exhibit less price volatility than
do individual stocks,3 39 lower margins on stock index futures are justi-
fled.34° Different margin requirements are also justified by the fact that
settlement in the futures markets occurs daily, whereas settlement may
take as long as five days in the stock market.34 x
Finally, if stocks and derivative instruments are viewed as one market,
Reserve Bank of New York concluded that "[h]igher initial margin requirements are
associated with a reduction in both actual stock market volatility and excess stock market
volatility." Id. at 81. The director of research at the New York Fed, however, cautioned
that the results of the study should not be regarded as definitive and that they do not have
policy implications. See Anders, Study Links Margin Rise, Market Calm, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 13, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
334. That is, margins, which can act as performance bonds, protect market partici-
pants against the defaults of others.
335. If margin requirements do serve a purpose, then it must be to "guarantee
perfomance on contracts that require transactions in the future." Figlewski, supra note
329, at 399. Since stock purchases are generally settled five business days after the date of
the trade, there is a risk that the purchaser will default on his obligation to pay the
purchase price by settlement date in the event of an unfavorable price movement. See id.
at 393. Thus, margins serve the purpose of ensuring market integrity in both the futures
and stock market.
336. See Working Group Report, supra note 16, app. B at 1.
337. See id.
338. Id. at 3.
339. An individual stock's risk (as measured by the variability of its return) is com-
posed of systematic and unsystematic risk elements. Since larger portfolios of several
stocks tend to diversify away the unsystematic component, a broad index of stocks will
exhibit a lower overall risk consisting of only the systematic (or market) element. See
supra text accompanying notes 118-123.
340. See Working Group Report, supra note 16, app. B at 3.
341. See Working Group Report, supra note 16, app. B at 3-6; cf Johnson, On Margin-
ing Futures Contracts, Wall St. J., May 11, 1988, at 21, col. 1 (If stocks were margined
under the system for margining futures, higher deposits would be required. Conversely,
if futures were margined like stocks, lower deposits would be required.).
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then cross-margining must be permitted.342 Cross-margining involves
the calculation of a single margin amount, in recognition of an investor's
hedged position in two offsetting investments that are made in separate
markets. Without cross-margining, margin deposits are made against
each investment. For example, a market participant who wants to estab-
lish a short index futures position should be able to use margin deposits
on long positions in stocks or options to satisfy the futures margin re-
quirement. Cross-margining focuses on the whole picture (that is, the
hedge created by economically offsetting positions) rather than on each
market separately. Analogously, when viewed as an economic whole,
hedged positions taken by institutional participants, such as pension
funds and index arbitrageurs, do not generate leverage and are considera-
bly less risky than unhedged positions. Thus, under a cross-margining
system, overall margin deposits may tend to be lower. While cross-mar-
gining is generally impermissible,343 it is being considered as a method of
simplifying payment structures and reducing the necessity of money
flows in order to reduce the strain on the financial system during periods
of volatility.3"
In summary, the "quick fix" of raising margins on stock index futures
contracts is probably an inappropriate response when the objective is to
curb the price volatility of the stock market that is perceived to be associ-
ated with program trading strategies. In any event, margin deposits for
stock index futures are justifiably lower than those required for stocks.
Higher margins on stock index futures would only raise transactions
costs and therefore reduce the number of futures market participants
who would be willing to assume risk. Consequently, stock index futures
would become a less effective instrument for hedging stock portfolios.
3. Establish Price Limits and Trading Halts
"Circuit breakers" such as daily price limits, which establish price
ranges in which transactions may occur, and temporary trading halts
have also been proposed as a way of reducing volatility.345 The only ma-
342. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 65-66; Working Group Report, supra
note 16, at 8.
343. The SEC and the CFTC have begun to approve pilot programs that permit cross-
margining between certain stock index futures contracts and options contracts. See SEC
Approves Pilot for Cross-Margining of Options, Futures, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1988, at C6,
col. 6.
344. See Working Group Report, supra note 16, app. D at 10-11 (the implementation
of cross-margining may require profound changes to current clearance and settlement
payment systems).
345. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 66; see also SEC Report, supra note 14,
ch. 3, at 3-23 to 24 (Generally, price limits should not be "imposed on stock trading,
[but] brief trading halts based on pre-set standard may warrant further consideration.");
Working Group Report, supra note 16, at 4, app. A at 1 (recommends the establishment
of a downward price limit on stock index futures and options at levels comparable to a
250 point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and a coordinated temporary
trading halt on all U.S. markets for stock and derivative instruments if the Dow Jones
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
jor stock market that employs price limits is the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change.34 6 Price limits have long been in place for many futures
contracts in the United States, but such limits had not been used for
stock index futures until shortly after the October 1987 crash.347 The
price of a futures contract that is subject to a daily limit is permitted to
rise or fall "only within a prescribed range from the previous day's settle-
ment price."3 48 The market does not close when price limits are reached;
rather, trades cannot be made at a price above the upper limit (if the
upper limit is reached) or below the lower limit (if the lower limit is
reached).349
On the other hand, temporary trading halts, which are prompted when
prices advance or decline more than a pre-established magnitude, do stop
the market and serve the same purposes as daily price limits.350 If the
bounds set in connection with daily price limits or trading halts are broad
enough so as not to interfere with "normal" trading, these circuit breaker
mechanisms may provide an important pause in the stock and futures
markets, allowing market participants time to rationally evaluate "exces-
sive" price movements. Because price limits and trading halts can pro-
vide a time-out from frantic trading, they may curb credit risk by giving
broker-dealers, clearing houses, and customers an opportunity to settle
Industrial Average falls 250 points below the previous day's closing level). Subsequently,
the stock, options, and futures exchanges adopted coordinated "circuit breakers" in re-
sponse to the recommendations of the Working Group on Financial Markets. See Ricks,
U.S. Regulators Clear 'Circuit Breakers' to Halt Trading After Big Market Drop, Wall St.
J., Oct. 19, 1988, at A18, col. 1.
346. See CME Report, supra note 5, at 50; SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 11, at 11-13
to 14. Besides Japan, several other countries have price limits on their stock exchanges.
See Roll, The International Crash of 1987, in Black Monday and the Future of Financial
Markets 54 (R. Kamphuis, Jr., R. Kormendi & J. Watson eds. 1989) (Austria, Belgium,
France, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland).
347. Actually, some index futures contracts initially had maximum daily price fluctua-
tion limits when they were introduced, but these limits were subsequently removed. See
CFTC Final Report, supra note 6, at 184-85. In an emergency action "[o]n October 23,
the CME instituted a daily price limit of 30 points above or below the previous day's
settlement price... in the S&P 500 contract." CME Report, supra note 5, at 50. Subse-
quently, the CME adopted a 15 index point (up or down) limit on a permanent basis. See
CFTC Final Report, supra note 6, at 185; Chicago Merc Says CFTC Cleared Daily Price
Limit, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 24, col. 2; see also CFTC Final Report, supra note 6,
app. C Exhibit C-1 (listing price limits on other actively traded stock index futures
contracts).
348. F. Horn, supra note 24, at 32-33. For example, in wheat the daily limit may be 20
cents per bushel. R. Teweles & F. Jones, supra note 42, at 68. If wheat closed at 300
cents per bushel on one day, then 320 would be the upper daily limit and 280 the lower
limit. Hence, the maximum daily range of price movement is 40 cents per bushel.
349. See F. Horn, supra note 24, at 35.
350. The Working Group on Financial Markets has recommended that all U.S. mar-
kets for equity and equity-related products halt trading for one hour if the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) declines 250 points from its previous day's closing level. See
Working Group Report, supra note 16, app. A at 1-3. When the markets reopen, if the
DJIA declines 400 points below the previous day's close, trading should halt for two
hours. See id. at 3.
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up accounts.351 Thus, price limits and trading halts can impose an im-
portant cooling-off period on overreacting stock and futures market
participants.352
Despite these beneficial features, daily price limits and trading halts
have considerable negative side-effects. First, the existence of pre-an-
nounced artificial limits, which restrict continuous trading, may create a
"gravity effect"-accelerating price movements toward a limit.353 "The
very movement of the price toward the boundary can sometimes itself
assure that the boundary will be reached. ' 354  Second, uncoordinated
price limits or trading halts, imposed without coordination between mar-
kets, are of questionable effectiveness. 355 For example, suppose the price
of stock index futures reaches its daily lower limit, and therefore no fur-
ther trades can be made beyond that limit on that day.35 6 If limits and
halts are not coordinated across markets, portfolio managers, who were
selling futures to hedge losses in the stock market and are now unable to
do so, will simply begin selling their portfolios directly on the stock mar-
ket, thus potentially exacerbating a market decline.3 7 Third, halting
trading in the United States markets may simply serve to transfer busi-
ness to foreign markets.3 8 Finally, "trying to control price movements,
and hence risks, can only diminish the ability of the markets to reflect
external realities. '3 9 Artificial constraints may prevent investors from
engaging in transactions in equities that reflect their assessments of
macro and microeconomic events. Hence, price limits and trading halts
may impair the ability of the stock market to allocate capital resources
efficiently to those firms who will use them in the most productive
fashion.
One year after the crash, the stock, options, and futures exchanges
adopted "circuit breakers," which are generally coordinated across the
markets. 361 For example, all stock trading on the NYSE will halt for one
351. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 66.
352. See CFTC Final Report, supra note 6, at 182.
353. See CME Report, supra note 5, at 51.
354. Id.
355. See id.; Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 66-67.
356. The futures market is likely to hit the boundary earlier. Lower transaction costs
in the futures markets (as compared with the stock market) allow changing investor ex-
pectations to effect sales more rapidly. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
357. In other words, in linked markets, uncoordinated price limits and trading halts
defeat the primary economic purpose of the futures markets, which is to facilitate the
mutually desired transfer of risk. A similar scenario occurred during the crash of 1987 as
a result of trading halts and jammed communication systems. See Task Force Report,
supra note 11, at 66-67.
358. See Zecher, Regulatory Issues, in After the Crash 50 (R. Mackay ed. 1988).
359. Let the Markets Trade, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1988, at 26, col. 1.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 302-06.
361. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 26,198
(Oct. 19, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 41,637 (1988); Letters from Jean A. Webb, Secretary,
CFTC to Paul J. Draths, Vice President and Secretary, Chicago Board of Trade; Todd E.
Petzel, Vice President, Chicago Mercantile Excahnge; Michael Braude, President, Kan-
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hour when the DJIA declines 250 or more points from its previous day's
closing.362 Comparable trigger values are established in the futures mar-
kets. Trading on the S&P 500 futures contracts at the CME will halt for
one hour if there is a 30 point decline in futures prices.363 Once stock
trading has been reopened, trading would halt for an additional two
hours if the DJIA declines 400 points from the previous day's close.3 4
Similarly, the CME will suspend trading on S&P 500 futures contracts
for two hours if there is also a 50 point decline in futures prices from the
previous day's closing. 365 The futures exchanges also agreed to set daily
price limits that are comparable to the 250 and 400 point DJIA trigger
levels.3 66 The new rules do not impose trading halts in the stock market
when the DJIA increases "excessively." There are upward price limits,
in the futures markets, however, that are comparable to a 400 point in-
crease in the DJIA.367 Thus, in a wildly bullish market, there is no coor-
dinated circuit breaker.
4. Limited Access to SuperDot
In an effort to limit stock price volatility, the NYSE adopted a rule
(the so-called "Collar Rule") for a six-month pilot period. The rule pro-
hibits member firms from using the SuperDot system368 for index arbi-
trage when the DJIA has moved more than fifty points from the previous
day's close. 36 9  The restriction applies to both customer and proprietary
sas City Board of Trade; Milton M. Stein, Vice President, New York Futures Exchange
(Oct. 18, 1988) (approving proposed amendments to rules governing futures and options
contracts); see also Memorandum of the Division of Economic Analysis, CFTC (Oct. 17,
1988) (discussion of proposed "circuit breaker" provisions for domestic stock index fu-
tures contracts) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review).
362. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 26,198
(Oct. 19, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 41,637 (1988).
363. See Letter from Jean A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC to Todd E. Petzel, Vice Presi-
dent, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Oct. 18, 1988). Besides the 30 point trigger, the
CME will halt futures and options trading for thirty minutes if there is a 12 point decline
in futures prices. See id. This trigger is not coordinated with a trading halt on the whole
stock market. However, it is somewhat related to the NYSE's new rule that establishes a
''sidecar" file for the market orders involving program trading entered into the DOT
system. This new rule could halt trading on individual stocks that are affected by heavy
program trading. See infra text accompanying notes 379-82.
364. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 26,198
(Oct. 19, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 41,637 (1988).
365. See Letter from Jean A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC to Todd E. Petzel, Vice Presi-
dent, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Oct. 18, 1988) (available in the files of the Fordham
Law Review).
366. See Memorandum of the Division of Economic Analysis, CFTC (Oct. 17, 1988)
(discussion of proposed "circuit breaker" provision for domestic stock index futures
contract).
367. See id.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 347-49.
369. Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 25,599 (Apr. 19,
1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 13,371 (1988). The NYSE announced Rule 80A on January 14,
1988, and requested member firms to comply voluntarily with the Collar Rule restriction.
It was approved by the SEC on April 19, 1988. Rule 80A only limits access to SuperDot
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orders and remains in effect for the remainder of any trading day on
which it is triggered.37 ° Because SuperDot allows arbitrageurs to rapidly
execute purchases or sales of many stocks, many market participants per-
ceive that index arbitrage accelerates price changes. Theoretically, in the
short run, such a rule is beneficial because it might reassure investors by
slowing price swings.
Restricting access to SuperDot did not stop index arbitrage, but it did
not make trading less efficient and more expensive to execute. When the
DJIA moves more than fifty points, arbitrageurs at large securities bro-
kerage firms simply switched their method of doing index arbitrage.371
They substituted a few key strokes on their computers for screaming bro-
kers running up to the posts with handfuls of orders.372
The NYSE rule, which reduces the efficiency of index arbitrage, can
adversely affect the usefulness of stock index futures as a hedge against
unfavorable price movements. Index futures provide benefits to their
users only if market participants are confident that these derivative in-
struments are linked to the underlying indices. Arbitrage maintains
these links.373 Because the NYSE rule tends to disconnect the stock mar-
ket from the futures market at the very time that efficient pricing between
the two markets is needed-when the market is volatile-pension fund
managers may hesitate to use stock index futures to adjust the risk of
their portfolios. For example, portfolio insurance may become too ex-
pensive.374 In short, a lack of confidence in this arbitrage linkage greatly
reduces the hedging value of index futures.375
With Collar Rule in place, on April 14, 1988, the DJIA fell 101 points,
the fifth worst decline in history.37 6 The SEC has concluded that the rule
when the transaction is part of an index arbitrage strategy. Consequently, "straight"
program buys or sells can still be routed through the system. However, the NYSE is
considering a rule that will completely bar access to SuperDot when the DJIA moves 150
points. See Smith, Big Board Mulls Trade Ban If Market Swings, Wall St. J., Apr. 13,
1988, at 3, col. 1.
370. Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 25,599, 53 Fed.
Reg. 13,371 (Apr. 22, 1988).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
372. See Anders, Curbs on Automated 'Program Trading'Are Set Off; Manual Trades
Cut Impact, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
374. When stock index futures prices fail to predictably track ther underlying index
(i.e., basis risk), which would be the case when there is no arbitrage between the two
markets, selling stock index futures as part of a portfolio insurance strategy may be more
expensive than selling the stocks themselves. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
375. See H. Stoll & R. Whaley, supra note 117, at 22.
376. See A Wider Trade Deficit Jolts a Fragile Market; Shares Off 101 Points, Wall St.
J., Apr. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 6. The Colar Rule will probably be phased out at the end of
the six-month pilot period. See Swartz & Ricks, Big Board Reportedly Will End its Curb
on Program Trading in Volatile Sessions, Wall St. J., July 6, 1988, at 3, col. 1. While the
NYSE plans to drop the Collar Rule, it is going forward with the other measures. See
Salwen, Program Traders See No Big Obstacles in Plan to Limit Stock, Futures Decline,
Wall St. J., July 11, 1988, at 30, col. 1.
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has relatively little effect at reducing market volatility. 377 Eventually the
Collar Rule was deleted and replaced by a new NYSE proposal.
New Rule 80A, the so-called "sidecar" file proposal, imposes certain
trading limitations when the price of the primary S&P 500 futures con-
tract on the CME falls twelve points below the previous day's closing
value (the approximate equivalent of a 96 point drop in the DJIA).378 If
this trigger value is reached, for the next five minutes market orders in-
volving program trading in each of the stocks underlying the S&P 500
entered into the NYSE's DOT system will be routed into a separate file
for each such stock.379 After this time period has elapsed, the orders in
the file for each stock and the order imbalance, if any, will be reported to
the public and the specialists and will be eligible for executions, but if
there is insufficient trading interest to allow for an orderly execution of a
transaction in a stock, the NYSE will halt trading in that stock.3 0 Thus,
unlike the Collar Rule, the sidecar file will not prohibit program traders
from utilizing the SuperDOT system.38' However, its effectiveness for
reducing volatility remains untested.
In summary, some of the quick fixes that have been recommended as
treatment for curing "excessive" stock price volatility and restoring in-
vestors' confidence in the markets appear to be myopic responses to the
nature of and changes in the financial markets.
B. Diagnosis: Long Run Structural Problems
In the aftermath of the October 1987 stock market crash, regulatory
efforts have focused on curbing stock price volatility. In general, how-
ever, these endeavors will not be constructive in the long run because
they fail to consider adequately the current (and future) structural envi-
ronment of the financial markets. Stock price volatility is likely to con-
tinue due to three factors characteristic of the financial markets: the
short-term focus of "institutional investors"; continuing innovations in
technology; and the globalization of money flows.
377. See Memorandum from Richard G. Ketchum, Director of the Division of Market
Regulation to David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(July 6, 1988).
378. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 26,198
(Oct. 19, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 41,637, 41,639 (1988).
379. See id. The entry of new stop orders by professional investors will also be re-
stricted when the trigger value is reached.
380. See id.
381. In addition to the establishment of a sidecar file, the NYSE also proposed to add a
new feature to SuperDOT: the Individual Investor Express Delivery Service ("IIEDS").
Under IIEDS, market orders of individual investors (not institutional investors) of up to
2,099 shares entered on the SuperDOT system will be given priority in delivery to the
specialist's post ahead of other orders being routed over the SuperDOT system. IIEDS is
activated when the DJIA rises or falls 25 points from the previous day's closing value; it
then remains in effect for the remainder of the trading day. See id. at 41,640.
[Vol. 57240
THE CRASH OF 1987
1. The Short-term Focus of Institutional Investors
"Institutional investor" has become a contradiction in terms. 38 2 As
the share of corporate securities held by institutional investors grows
larger and as the percentage of trading volume accounted for by these
institutions surges,383 the objectives of securities and commodities regula-
tions and the objectives of institutional investors come into conflict and
may contribute to the undermining of the economic functions of the fi-
nancial markets.38 4 In particular, while traditionally some may consider
the stock market as a market for long-term investing and the futures
market as a market for hedging portfolio values (or initiating readjust-
ments), many major institutional investors view stocks and futures as in-
terchangeable instruments used for the purpose of implementing short-
term trading strategies designed to earn quick profits.315
The major financial sectors are dominated by a few, very large institu-
tions that manage an enormous amount of financial assets.386 Institu-
tional investors (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies,
foundations and endowments and securities broker-dealers) control ap-
proximately 35 percent of the total market value of all New York Stock
Exchange-listed stocks.38 7 Institutional investors dominate trading
although they do not own the majority of stocks.388 They probably ac-
count for more than 80 percent of the volume on the NYSE, up from 20
percent in 1960.389 This trading by institutional investors causes the vol-
382. See Rohatyn, Institutional 'Investor' of 'Speculator'. Wall St. J., June 24, 1988, at
18, col. 4; J. Brooks, supra note 240, at 134-35 (Institutional investors have become trad-
ers; "'long-term holding' in institutional portfolios no longer exists.").
383. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study II, at 11-12; SEC Report, supra note
14, ch. 3, at 3-2; Light & Perold, The Institutionalization of Wealth: Changing Pattern of
Investment Decision Making, in Wall Street and Regulation 97, 108 (S. Hayes, III ed.
1987).
384. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 271.
385. See CFTC Final Report, supra note 6, at 138. "It is the definition of the time
period for the investment return and the predictability of the returns that often distin-
guish an investment from a speculation." B. Malkiel, supra note 249, at 18. Investment
is characterized as a strategy for purchasing stock in order to gain profit in the form of
reasonably predictable dividends and/or appreciation over the long term. See id.
386. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 227. At the end of 1984,
less than 1 percent of the total number of firms in the securities, banking, and life insur-
ance industries controlled half of the resources in those industries. See id. at 226. Thirty-
seven firms managed half ($1.2 trillion) of all assets of beneficiaries. See id. at 227.
387. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 3 at 3-2; Restructuring Financial Markets,
supra note 299, at 269. At the end of 1987, the market value for all shares listed on the
NYSE was $2.2 trillion. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Fact Book 1988 81 (1988)
[hereinafter NYSE Fact Book].
388. At the end of 1986, households, personal trusts, and non-profits controlled 62.6
percent of the market value of stock. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study II, at
11-13.
389. See Light & Perold, supra note 383, at 108; Restructuring Financial Markets,
supra note 299, at 269. The annual turnover rate on the NYSE (share volume as a per-
centage of the average number of listed shares) has increased over the years, but most
sharply in the last decade: 12% in 1960, 21% in 1977, 36% in 1980, 49% in 1984, and
73% in 1987. See NYSE Fact Book, supra note 387, at 73 (1988).
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atility of stock prices.
Pension funds are the largest and fastest growing segment within the
group of institutional investors. In 1975, pension funds held 13 percent
of all outstanding equities, but by 1985, they controlled 22 percent.390
The passage of ERISA,3 91 which requires that employee benefit plans be
adequately funded, probably accounts for much of this growth. 392 "This
requirement led to a higher level of capital formation in the 1970s than
would otherwise have taken place because it mandated an increase in
purchases of assets by pension funds and, in that period, their acquisi-
tions were primarily long-term corporate bonds and stocks. ' 39 3 Never-
theless, the equity markets have failed to provide a significant new net
source of capital for business. 394 The fiduciary responsibilities imposed
on pension fund managers by ERISA may conflict with investment strat-
egies that promote the primary economic function of the securities mar-
ket. Traditionally, providing funds for capital formation assumes long-
term investment strategies on the part of both investors and issuers that
are intended to assure returns over time. Capital formation may also
involve a significant amount of risk. However, the fiduciary responsibil-
ity of pension fund managers implies a different investment strategy:
achieving the maximum return for beneficiaries with minimal risk.395
If plan fiduciaries focus on reducing risk, they may discourage pension
funds from investing in new issues of small companies and those in
emerging growth industries. New ventures are generally more risky than
established businesses. Consequently, pension managers may view such
390. See Light & Perold, supra note 383, at 98. In comparison, individual household
ownership fell from 74% to 60% during the same period. See id. Notably, in 1965,
pension funds held only 6% of all outstanding equities, while households controlled 84%.
See id.
391. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1982).
392. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 270; cf Light & Perold,
supra note 383, at 100.
393. Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 270 n.54 (citing The Future
of Financial Markets: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 256 (1983) (statement of Professor Benjamin M. Friedman, Harvard University)).
"Between 1953 and 1983, the net addition to the available funds of all nonfinancial U.S.
corporations provided by the excess of new stock issues over retirements of outstanding
stock, averaged just $4 billion per year, compared to $38 billion per year in net proceeds
from borrowing." Task Force Report, supra note 11, Study VII, at VII-2. Moreover,
from 1984 through the first half of 1987, the wave of corporate restructurings (e.g., lever-
aged buyouts, mergers and acquisitions) has resulted in the net retirement of equity, on
average, in the amount of $78.4 billion per year. See Task Force Report, supra note 11,
Study II, at 11-13.
394. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 266 (citing H. Kaufman,
Dangers in the Rapid Growth of Debt: The Need for a National Policy Response 5
(January 16, 1985) (address before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.)).
395. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 270; ERISA requires
that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties ... by diversifying the investments of the plan
so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
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investments as imprudent. Moreover, even if potential returns were
high, pension funds would not invest in small companies because each
fund is unable to buy enough shares of these companies to have an affect
on its portfolio return. Not only may the business risks associated with
these companies be higher, but their stocks are likely to be illiquid-
pension funds may find it difficult to sell the stock in a short period of
time. Consequently, institutional investors, including pension funds,
generally purchase only actively traded "blue chip" stocks such as those
that form the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the broader S&P 500
index. Thus, the increasing amount of funds under the control of institu-
tional investors may not be channelled to new companies that desire eq-
uity financing.
A considerable amount of institutional trading in stocks is performed
by pension fund managers who follow "short-term investment strategies
even though pension funds represent long-term commitments of funds
with relatively little requirement for liquidity." '396 Some corporate pen-
sion funds, particularly defined benefit plans, 397 encourage managers to
maximize returns during a short period of time, because high earnings in
one year allow the employer-sponsor to reduce contributions to the fund
in the following year.398 Moreover, recent changes in financial reporting
standards for pension funds may reinforce this emphasis.399 Under a
new accounting rule, expected pension liabilities must be computed an-
nually using market interest rates.' If this amount exceeds the market
value of fund assets under management, then the unfunded liability must
be disclosed on the company's balance sheet.4° 1 Consequently, corporate
executives, concerned about the potential negative effect of such a disclo-
sure on the price of corporate stock, favor short-term investment goals
rather than a long-term strategy that may not immediately achieve high
returns.4"z Thus, managers of pension funds are rewarded for following
short-term trading strategies as a method of obtaining quick profits.
Money management is a competitive business, and the performance
records of money managers are compared against those of their peers and
the market averages. Plan sponsors use these quarter-to-quarter or year-
396. Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 243.
397. Pension plans that specify the retirement benefit to be received at retirement
rather than the contributions to the plan are defined benefit plans.
398. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 243, 271 & n.62. The
employer-sponsor's annual contribution to the plan is determined by actuarial valuation.
If the pension fund manager succeeds in earning a return greater than the required con-
tribution, the excess can be used to reduce the amount of money that the sponsor must
contribute to the plan next year.
399. See Crossen, New Accounting Rule May Affect Pensions of Millions of People, Wall
St. J., Jan. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
400. See id. The new rule is Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 87,
Employers' Accounting for Pensions, which was promulgated by the Financial Account-
ing Standards Board.
401. See id.
402. See id.; see also Light & Perold, supra note 383, at 103.
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to-year measurements to determine whom to hire and whom to fire, in a
kind of "performance derby."'"' 3 Accordingly, in order to retain clients
or to attract new ones, investment managers strive to achieve superior
performance in the short-run. In an environment where performance is
judged from quarter-to-quarter, there is little incentive to look for "long-
term winners."'
This "performance derby" of the 1980s, which is characterized by
speculation in individual stocks and with whole portfolios, induces stock
trading." 5 For example, some institutions in making their investment
decisions focus on factors affecting the temporal price of a stock rather
than on fundamentals and the long-term worth of the company.4"6 Mere
rumor of takeover triggers buying sprees and propels stock prices up-
ward. Meantime, "[d]ay-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing in-
vestments, which are obviously of an ephemeral and non-significant
character, tend to have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, in-
fluence on the market." 7 Institutional investors are prone to over-react
to new information, and negative events receive a more than proportional
share of attention." 8 Consequently, portfolio managers are likely to sell
stocks quickly in response to unfavorable news."
Economic news (as compared with news about an individual company)
can have an especially profound effect on the stock market in this "knee-
jerk" environment. Because many institutional portfolios are well diver-
sified, they are only exposed to systematic (market) risk.410 Accordingly,
an unfavorable news report about one company may not induce an insti-
tution to sell that company's stock. On the other hand, an unfavorable
economic report, which affects all companies in the portfolio, could
spark a sell off of the whole stock portfolio.4 1 1 This outcome will not
403. See Light & Perold, supra note 383, at 107.
404. See M. Mayer, supra note 313, at 261-62.
405. See L. Lowenstein, What's Wrong With Wall Street 15 (1988).
406. See Restructuring Financial Markets, supra note 299, at 271.
407. J. Keynes, supra note 309, at 153-54. "It is said, for example, that the shares of
American companies which manufacture ice tend to sell at a higher price in summer
when their profits are seasonally high than in winter when no one wants ice." Id. at 154.
408. See Brown & Harlow, Market Overreaction: Magnitude and Intensity, J. Portfolio
Mgmt., Winter 1988, at 6, 12.
409. See J. Brooks, supra note 240, at 134. For example, on Oct. 15, 1983, Digital
Equipment Corp. announced a quarterly earnings drop of 72%. See id. Its stock price
proceeded to drop 22% in one day and 40% within two weeks. See id.
Did this mean, as it seemed to, that Digital as a company had suddenly fallen
out of the sky, and was no longer a worthy institutional investment? Not neces-
sarily; most leading companies suffer such temporary reverses at one time or
another, for one reason or another. It meant, rather, that institutional investors
knew that they themselves would cause the stock to take a nosedive on the bad
news, and fulfilled their own prophecy by stampeding to be the first out. In-
deed, three months later Digital came out with a favorable report; then the
stampede was in the other direction, and the stock price rose 30% in three days.
Id. at 134-35.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
411. Of course, selling stock index futures contracts can serve as a substitute for selling
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have a large effect on stock prices if the amount of selling pressure is
balanced to some extent by the buyers in the market.412 However, insti-
tutional investors are inclined to run in a pack and sell at the same
time.413
Institutional investors have homogeneous expectations because of their
herd instinct. "They may not always invest rationally, but they may be-
have rationally. The reason is simple: there is safety in numbers. ' 41 4 To
illustrate, a perceptive institutional portfolio manager in 1986 and early
1987 notices two things. First, stock prices are greatly overvalued based
on fundamental analysis. 41 '5 The high prices being paid for stocks are not
supported by the companies' expected future earnings and dividends.
Second, competing portfolio managers continue to buy stocks and are
profiting as the market is pushed even higher.
Because he cannot risk falling behind in the "performance derby," he
will probably follow the trend and also buy stocks (or at least continue to
hold them). Even if his fundamental analysis is correct, he does not
know when the buying frenzy will end. However, if he withdraws from
the stock market and it keeps rising, his reputation and even his job are
in jeopardy. In contrast, suppose he stays in the market. If his analysis
proves correct and the market drops, the worst that can happen is that
his performance will be about as poor as most of his competitors, some-
thing he can live with. Thus, for an institutional portfolio manager, there
was more "risk" in shunning the market than in joining it, even if one's
investment analysis indicates otherwise.416 Of course, when this specula-
tive bubble finally bursts, the institutional investment managers sell their
stock holdings-quickly; no one wants to come in last place in this race.
Thus, many institutional managers play a market timing game.41 7
They move whole portfolios in and out of the stock market, trading
thousands of shares at the touch of a key,4 1 "largely concerned, not with
making a superior long-term forecast of the probable yield of an invest-
the underlying diversified portfolio. However, as the Crash of 1987 made apparent, ex-
cessive selling pressure in the futures market will be transmitted to the stock market
through the process of index arbitrage.
412. See Reilly and Wachowicz, How Institutional Trading Reduces Market Volatility,
J. Portfolio Mgmt., Winter 1979, at 11, 16-17. If there is an absence of institutional
buyers, however, stock prices will plunge. See Rosenberg, Institutional Investors: Hold-
ings, Prices, and Liquidity, Fin. Analysts J., Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 53, 58.
413. See J. Brooks, supra note 240, at 134.
414. M. Johnson, The Random Walk and Beyond 166 (1988).
415. Fundamental analysis (as compared to technical analysis) focuses on the intrinsic
value of stocks. Intrinsic value is "the value which is justified by assets, earnings, divi-
dends, definite prospects, and the factor of management." S. Cottle, R. Murray & F.
Block, Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis 41 (5th ed. 1988).
416. See M. Johnson, supra note 414, at 166-67; see also J. Keynes, supra note 309, at
158 ("[w]ordly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than
to succeed unconventionally.").
417. See B. Malkiel, supra note 249, at 171-72 (move money between cash, equities,
and bonds).
418. The NYSE's DOT system permits such computer-assisted trading.
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ment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional
basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public" and other
portfolio managers.419
The following situation prevails in the securities markets: the majority
of institutions are investing in the same few hundred stocks, in which
they dominate the market; they have access to the same information, and
they process and react to that information in essentially the same way.
However, the winners in the performance game are those institutional
investors who can think like everybody else, only a few minutes
sooner.420 This game encourages speculation rather than investment.
Portfolio managers are more concerned with changes in investors' atti-
tudes about the stock market than with valuing the underlying
companies.
This "pursuit of price appreciation within a few weeks or even months
is not consistent with a proper concept of investment, because its success
depends more on a prompt change of attitude in the market than on
anything in the underlying business." 42 ' Consequently the job of the se-
curities markets-to direct new investment to those companies who will
use the funds in the most productive fashion-is not advanced.422
On the whole, "stock prices are nothing more than a mirror of reality,
and if reality is that the market is predominantly engaged in playing out
a short term, market-timing game, then the mirror will not reflect any-
thing better."423 Therefore, when new information enters the market or
sentiments reverse, the behavior of a few institutional investors may
cause a large price change in the stock market-whether directly or
through the index arbitrage link. If the change is bearish, the aggregate
shift in investor expectations can lead to an ensuing panic to avoid ex-
pected losses. This instability is due to fundamental characteristics of
human behavior: greed, fear, and the desire for quick results.424 Thus, a
change from short-term trading to "long-term 'investing' seems as un-
likely to occur as any other real change in human nature. '425
2. Continuing Innovations in Technology
Technological innovations coupled with the greater presence of institu-
tional investors have changed the structure of the financial markets. To-
day, while still owning the underlying securities, derivative instruments
allow investors to transfer price risk inexpensively to those willing to as-
sume it. The introduction and application of financial theories have pro-
419. J. Keynes, supra note 309, at 154.
420. See Hart, Don't Wait for the Stock Market to Cure Itself, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1988, at A26, col. 3.
421. L. Lowenstein, supra note 405, at 15.
422. See J. Keynes, supra note 309, at 159.
423. L. Lowenstein, supra note 405, at 53.
424. See Law, Wall Street and the Public Interest, in Wall Street and Regulation 182
(S. Hayes, III ed. 1987).
425. Id.
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vided investment managers with a framework for assessing risks and
returns and have spawned various program trading strategies. Through
modern data transmission and information processing, investors can fol-
low events as they unfold and respond rapidly. In part, the sharpness of
the October 1987 crash reflected these innovations. Despite the events of
Black Monday, innovations will continue to evolve in response to various
changes in our environment and may therefore enhance the efficiency of
the markets and contribute to the general welfare.426 However, innova-
tion in the financial markets is "reflexive": 427 while instability causes in-
novation, it is likely that innovation produces instability.42
Innovations in the financial markets generally take two forms, product
innovation and process innovation.429 Product innovation is the develop-
ment of new products such as stock index futures contracts, foreign cur-
rency options, and zero coupon bonds.4 30  By contrast, process
innovation is responsible for new methods of processing financial activity
such as the creation of linked exchanges, electronic trading, and portfo-
lio-level trading.431 Both forms of innovation, particularly during the
1980s, have proceeded at a rapid pace.432
Financial innovation is driven by a demand for new products or
processes that perform certain functions aimed at managing the uncer-
tainty of changes in the environment.433 Sources of instability that have
prompted such innovation include: the volatility of interest rates, cur-
rency exchange rates and stock prices; intensifying competition among
financial institutions; regulation and the circumvention of regulation; 434
the level of economic activity; tax changes; and technological ad-
vances.435 Thus, innovation and instability are intertwined.
426. See Silber, The Process of Financial Innovation, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 89, 94 (1983);
Van Home, Of Financial Innovations and Excesses, 40 J. Fin. 621, 630 (1985).
427. Cf Soros, Brady Commission Should've Stressed Market Stability, Wall St. J., Jan.
14, 1988, at 26, col. 3.
428. See Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations in International Bank-
ing 208-09 (1986) [hereinafter BIS].
429. See Van Home, supra note 426, at 621.
430. See J. Walmsley, The New Financial Instruments 6 (1988); Van Home, supra
note 426, at 625.
431. See J. Walmsley, supra note 430, at 4-6; Van Home, supra note 426, at 625;
Grundfest, The New Technology of Finance, Fin. Executive, Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 44, 45-46.
Examples of process innovation include: the creation of an Intermarket Trading System
that links all regional stock exchanges; electronic trading, which can be done through the
National Association of Securities Dealers' Small Order Execution System; and the trad-
ing of whole portfolios of many securities instead of individual issues.
432. See J. Walmsley, supra note 430, at 4-6.
433. See BIS, supra note 428, at 171, 174.
434. See Kane, Policy Implications of Structural Changes in Financial Markets, 73 Am.
Econ. Rev. 96, 96 (1983).
435. See J. Walmsley, supra note 430, at 8-11; Van Home, supra note 426, at 622.
Besides equities, the increased volatility in interest rates and foreign exchange has
brought about innovations such as interest-rate swaps and foreign currency options. See
Finance Brief- A Risky Business, Economist, May 28, 1988, at 81-82.
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Finance is a technology,43 6 and some innovations in finance have inte-
grated markets previously separated by geography and differences in reg-
ulatory treatment. The development of new financial products and
trading strategies are inevitable because such innovations are responses
to the needs of the market participants. For instance, the introduction of
a price-risk-transferring innovation such as stock index futures contracts
can be attribtited to the perception of an increased volatility in stock
prices.437 When an institutional investor is worried about falling stock
prices, it can reduce its portfolio's equity exposure without selling the
underlying stocks by selling stock index futures instead. This hedging
strategy is a cheaper and more efficient method of temporarily investing
in "synthetic" Treasury securities particularly if the portfolio manager
wants to participate in the equity market when it rises but quickly get out
when it falls.438 Similarly, institutions wanted to trade whole portfolios
of stocks cheaply and quickly; program trading and stock index futures
were the answer.439 Consequently, the futures and stock markets became
linked through index arbitrage." 0
If an innovation becomes unnecessary, it will be discarded, or if it fails
to achieve its purpose, financial "engineers" will go back to the drawing
board and re-address the problem. For example, after portfolio insur-
ance did not function at the very time it was supposed to (when stock
prices were plunging on October 19th), portfolio insurance users discon-
tinued the strategy. Although this particular implementation did not
work, people in the financial services industry are now busily developing
better methods of program trading." Therefore, regulatory efforts
436. Grundfest, supra note 431, at 44.
437. See BIS, supra note 428, at 174.
438. The commission expense and market impact cost associated with selling the un-
derlying stocks composing the S&P 500 index and then buying the stocks back are much
greater than selling and buying stock index futures. See supra text accompanying notes
137-40.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35. "[T]he futures market has grown as it
has because it meets a need in the overall investment picture. Even if the market were to
close, 'there would still be a demand to trade baskets of stocks.'" Salwen, Pros See Fall
in Stock Prices If Index Futures Are Ended, Wall St. J., June 14, 1988, at 37, col. 3
(quoting Robert R. Glauber, a member of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mecha-
nisms).
Another example of necessity impelling innovation is illustrated by block trading. In
the 1960s and 1970s institutional investors started trading tens of thousands of shares of
individual securities (block trades), but this task was difficult because New York Stock
Exchange specialists were unable to execute these large transactions cheaply and quickly.
As a result, investment firms (block positioners) began to arrange these trades in their
own firms ("upstairs") away from the NYSE and the comparatively undercapitalized
specialists. Thus, the institutional investors found a better way of doing business. See M.
Mayer, supra note 313, at 38-39; J. Walmsley, supra note 430, at 18.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
441. See Anders, Four Stock Exchanges Vie to Develop Trading Method to Ease Large
Orders, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1988, at 4, col. 2 (portfolio-level trading); Norris, Maligned or
Malign?, Barron's, Mar. 21, 1988, at 30 (portfolio insurance).
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should not discourage the development of new financial products and
strategies. The market will eventually recognize its own limitation.
Technological advances in communications and information process-
ing systems are beneficial. The ability of the financial markets to gather
information about the economy, corporations, and government policies
has been greatly enhanced by the new technology. The introduction and
rapid assimilation of computers and data communication networks have
enabled investors to gather more information and process it faster than
ever before, responding to changes in the marketplace. For example,
from computer terminals investors can inexpensively access historical fi-
nancial data or monitor current news events.' 2 They can then utilize
systems such as the NYSE's DOT to execute transactions. Accordingly,
these innovations have resulted in more rapid investment flows: new in-
formation is disseminated faster and investors are able to respond by
quickly buying or selling.
While technological innovations have increased the efficiency of the
markets," 3 they render the market more susceptible to volatility.4 " The
use of such technology by over-reactive, short-term oriented, trend fol-
lowing, institutional investors may result in "excessive" stock price
movements. Thus, we have come full circle: while innovations may de-
velop as a response to volatility, these same innovations have also fos-
tered volatility. Because technological advances, both in finance and
information processing, are "powerful long-lasting forces ... even in a
stable environment," innovation and hence volatility are here to stay." 5
3. Globalization of Money Flows
Innovation has not only integrated the United States financial markets,
it has linked them with foreign markets as well." 6 Institutional investors
from around the world are diversifying their portfolios on a global basis,
and they can rapidly move their capital internationally in the hope of
achieving higher risk-adjusted returns. As a result, the frequency of ab-
rupt and unpredictable shifts in international money flows have a consid-
erable impact on the United States financial markets. Therefore, the
globalization of financial markets contributes to the volatility of stock
prices, the loss of investors' confidence, and therefore exacerbates the in-
stability of the domestic economy. 447
442. The major suppliers of news and financial information are Reuters, Telerate, and
Quotron. See Finance: From Foreign Desk to Foreign Exchange, Economist, July 23,
1988, at 63, 63-64.
443. The widespread availability of inexpensive and timely information has improved
the market's ability to price securities.
444. The sharpness of the crash of 1987, in part, reflected the market's use of and
reliance on these modem computer technologies. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 75.
445. See BIS, supra note 428, at 184.
446. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 11, at 11-1; Sesit, Stock Crash Highlights the
Perils of Linked Market, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 12, col. 1.
447. See M. Mayer, supra note 313, at 266-71; see also SEC Report, supra note 14, ch.
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Communication technology has linked the world's markets so as to
encourage global, twenty-four hour trading." 8 Shortly after the New
York Stock Exchange closes at 4 p.m., the Tokyo Stock Exchange begins
trading at 7 p.m., New York time." 9 Tokyo has stopped trading by 1
a.m., but at 4 a.m. the London Stock Exchange opens.4 50 A couple of
hours before London's market closes, the NYSE resumes activity at 9:30
a.m., and the cycle repeats.4a ' Futures trading has also gone around the
world and around the clock as these markets expand through electronic
links.452
The international mobility of capital makes United States financial reg-
ulators less effective at influencing the domestic markets. 4 3 Globaliza-
tion means that capital can leave the United States markets for foreign
ones whenever investors perceive that the benefits of trading overseas (af-
ter taking into account the risks) exceed those domestically available.454
If United States regulatory agencies adopt rules that constrain the trad-
ing activities of institutional investors (sufficiently raising margins on
stock index futures so as to make them very expensive hedging instru-
ments) when costs exceed benefits, the institutions may move their trans-
actions to other markets that have a more favorable regulatory
environment.455
11, at 11-21 ("The events of October, 1987 compellingly demonstrated that the world's
securities markets have become inextricably linked. That trend is irreversible .... ").
448. See Burgess, Sun Never Sets on the World's Linked Markets, Wash. Post, Nov. 1,
1987, at HI, col. 5.
Possibly North America's first experiment at intercontinental trading occurred in 1896.
William Jennings Bryan had been nominated for president by the Democrats on
a platform of "bimetalism," a bid to adopt a gold and silver standard that would
break what was seen as the sinister world dominance of Britain's single stan-
dard of gold. Investors were nervous. So on election night, New York brokers
tried something new. They stayed open to the early morning hours at special
offices in midtown Manhattan, giving wealthy clients the chance to trade Amer-
ican securities in London, via undersea telegraph cable, basing their decisions
on early election returns.
Money Flows Freely Around World Today, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1987, at H4, col. 1.
449. See Burgess, supra note 448, at H1, col. 5.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. See McMurray, Chicago Merc, Reuters Set Pact for Trading Link, Wall St. J.,
June 21, 1988, at 59, col. 1. While futures contracts are already being traded in many
countries, these markets have only recently "reached out" for business. Globex is an
electronic trading network that will permit after-hour trading on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME). See id. The CME already has a link with the Singapore International
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). See J. Walmsley, supra note 430, at 104.
453. See J. Grundfest, supra note 312, at 19.
454. See id.
455. See id.
For instance, Japan and West Germany have developed organized futures markets to
compete with those in the United States. See Roth, German Futures Exchange Slated for
1989 Launch, Wall St. J., July 27, 1988, at 44, col. 4; Graven, Osaka Striving to Lead
Japan's Futures Trading, Wall St. J., June 20, 1988, at 19, col. 3; see also America's
Capital Markets, Economist, June 11, 1988, at 17-18 (survey). Indeed, on October 14 to
16 of 1987, institutional investors sold short a significant amount of U.S. equities in the
THE CRASH OF 1987
A consequence of the globalization of money flows is that the national
economy, as a whole, must compete internationally for capital. "The in-
tegration of national financial markets is related to, and supported by,
the broader force of the global integration of overall economic structures.
These linkages through increased trade, investment and travel are a long
lasting process." '456 The instability of United States and foreign institu-
tional investors' expectations concerning the economic health of the na-
tion vis-a-vis that of other countries may result in frequent and
unpredictable shifts of funds in and out of the United States financial
markets. Therefore, the globalization of financial markets may contrib-
ute to the volatility of stock prices, and this trend is likely to continue.457
CONCLUSION
One year has now passed since the crash of 1987. The volatility of a
year ago is gone; many institutions are now holding cash instead of equi-
ties.45 Fear temporarily dominates the minds of institutional investors.
While the markets are calm, financial policymakers should take this time
to address the long-run structural problems of the markets: the short-
term focus of institutional "investors"; continuing innovations in tech-
nology; and the globalization of money flows. Program trading is only
one recent consequence of these long-run characteristics of the markets.
London Market. See SEC Report, supra note 14, ch. 2, at 2-10 to 11. Sales of equities
and futures contracts can take place outside the U.S. exchanges in the London market
through exchanges-for physicals (EFPs). EFPs "involve simultaneous transactions in a
basket of index stocks... and index futures in a noncompetitive transfer of ownership
between the parties; one party buys the stocks and simultaneously sells (or gives up a
long) futures contract while the other party sells the stocks and simultaneously buys (or
receives a long) futures contract." Id. ch. 2, at 2-11.
A further example of institutional investors going abroad took place in the U.S. Treas-
ury bond futures contract market. On October 19, 1987, these contracts hit their upper
price limit on the Chicago Board of Trade. As a result, on the next day the volume of
Treasury bond futures contracts traded on the London International Financial Futures
Exchange was eight times the previous day's volume in Chicago. See America's Capital
Markets, Economist, June 11, 1988, at 24 (survey).
456. BIS, supra note 428, at 185.
457. Two authors forecast that:
[W]ithin the next 10 years, capital and financial markets will be linked electron-
ically through a network of depository and custodian banks and centralized
clearing organizations to create a Global capital and financial system for clear-
ing and settling transactions. The exchange of securities and derivative instru-
ments will occur as book entries and journaled credits and debits. Physical
securities and their transfer will be eliminated. Securities will be registered at a
Global registry and depository trust. Universal banks and multinational bro-
kerage firms will execute orders and perform record-keeping procedures for
their clients as usual. The difference will be that clients can trade listed securi-
ties, options, and financial futures contracts on any world exchange from their
primary exchange-whether it be New York, London, Paris, or Toronto.
W. Nix & S. Nix, The Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to International Securities, Futures, and
Options Markets 23 (1988).
458. See Metz & White, Going Nowhere: A Year After Its Peak, Stock Market Battles a
Pervasive Malaise, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
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Because of the long-term nature of these problems and their synergy, we
may have to live with greater financial volatility.
Is another financial crash likely to occur? Yes. Speculative trading by
short-term oriented institutional investors will cause stock prices to rise
to insupportable levels, and when the bubble breaks few will be left un-
scathed. In the long run, market regulations will not prevent declines in
stock prices, and in the short run, these measures have undesirable effects
such as retarding the ability of investors to adapt to changes in the global
marketplace and sending capital overseas. Therefore, if the nation's
policymakers do anything, they should take steps to ensure that the fi-
nancial system can withstand the effects of these inevitable price shocks
instead of focusing only on increasing the regulation of the markets.459
459. See Hatfield, Stock Market Crash Lessons, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1988, at 15, col. 2.
